Vanderbilt Law Review
Volume 74

Issue 5

Article 1

10-2021

The People's Ledger: How to Democratize Money and Finance the
Economy
Saule T. Omarova

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr
Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Saule T. Omarova, The People's Ledger: How to Democratize Money and Finance the Economy, 74
Vanderbilt Law Review ()
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol74/iss5/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Vanderbilt Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information,
please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu.

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
____________________________________________________________

VOLUME 74

OCTOBER 2021

NUMBER 5

____________________________________________________________

ARTICLES
The People’s Ledger: How to
Democratize Money and Finance the
Economy
Saule T. Omarova *
The COVID-19 crisis underscored the urgency of digitizing sovereign
money and ensuring universal access to banking services. It pushed two related
ideas—the issuance of central bank digital currency and the provision of retail
deposit accounts by central banks—to the forefront of the public policy debate.
To date, however, the debate has not produced a coherent vision of how
democratizing access to central bank money would—and should—transform
and democratize the entire financial system. This lack of a systemic perspective
obscures the enormity of the challenge and dilutes our ability to tackle it.
This Article takes up that challenge. It offers a blueprint for a
comprehensive restructuring of the central bank balance sheet as the basis for
redesigning the core architecture of modern finance. Focusing on the U.S.
Federal Reserve System (“the Fed”), the Article outlines a series of structural
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reforms that would radically redefine the role of a central bank as the ultimate
public platform for generating, modulating, and allocating financial resources
in a democratic economy—the People’s Ledger.
On the liability side of the ledger, the Article envisions the complete
migration of demand deposit accounts to the Fed’s balance sheet and explores
the full range of new, more direct and more flexible, monetary policy tools
enabled by this shift. On the asset side, it advocates a comprehensive qualitative
restructuring of the Fed’s investment portfolio, which would maximize its
capacity to channel credit to productive uses in the nation’s economy. This
compositional overhaul of the Fed’s balance sheet would fundamentally alter
the operations and systemic footprints of private banks, funds, derivatives
dealers, and other financial institutions and markets. Analyzing these
structural implications, the Article shows how the proposed reforms would
make the financial system less complex, more stable, and more efficient in
serving the long-term needs of the American people.

INTRODUCTION .............................................................................
THE CENTRAL BANK BALANCE SHEET IN “FRANCHISE”
I.
FINANCE: AN OVERVIEW ....................................................
A.
Franchise Finance: The Logic of the System .........
B.
The Fed’s Balance Sheet as the
“Franchisor Ledger” ...............................................
1.
The Liability Side .......................................
2.
The Asset Side ............................................
II.
THE FRANCHISOR LEDGER AT ITS LIMIT: THE IMPACT
OF COVID-19 .....................................................................
A.
The Asset Side: “Whatever It Takes” ......................
B.
The Liability Side: What’s Next? ...........................
III.
REFORMING THE LIABILITY SIDE: PUBLIC ACCESS AND
MONETARY POLICY ............................................................
A.
The Proposal: FedAccounts as a Tool of
Monetary Policy .....................................................
B.
Transforming the Core of the Franchise:
Institutional Design Issues ....................................
IV.
REFORMING THE ASSET SIDE: PUBLIC-PRIVATE
CAPITAL ALLOCATION ........................................................
A.
The Proposal: New Discount Window, Public
Infrastructure Finance, and Systemic
Stabilization Portfolio ...........................................
1.
“New Discount Window” Loans ..................
2.
The National Investment
Authority Issuances ...................................

1233
1239
1239
1241
1242
1244
1246
1247
1249
1257
1257
1263
1268
1268
1270
1272

2021]

THE PEOPLE’S LEDGER

3.
“OMO Plus” Assets .....................................
B.
The Fed’s Balance Sheet as the
“People’s Ledger” ....................................................
V.
THE PEOPLE’S LEDGER IN ACTION:
STRUCTURAL IMPLICATIONS ..............................................
A.
Potential Impact on the Banking Sector ................
B.
Potential Impact on Shadow Banking and
Capital Markets .....................................................
1.
Money Market Mutual Funds ....................
2.
Commercial Paper and Repo Markets .......
3.
Securitizations and Derivatives .................
4.
Securities Firms .........................................
CONCLUSION .................................................................................

1233
1275
1277
1282
1283
1288
1288
1290
1294
1296
1299

INTRODUCTION
In 1896, William Jennings Bryan delivered his historic “Cross of
Gold” speech, making a passionate plea for a monetary system that
served the interests of the working people and increased the nation’s
prosperity. 1 Today, the precise contours of that political ideal are once
again intensely contested. After decades of rising inequality, systemic
instability, and relentless concentration of economic power, ordinary
Americans are demanding a greater say in the distribution and use of
financial resources. The Reddit-fueled GameStop rally, 2 the dramatic
rise of Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies, 3 the “universal basic
income” 4 and “public banking” 5 movements—these are all discrete
1.
See Bryan’s “Cross of Gold” Speech: Mesmerizing the Masses, HIST. MATTERS,
http://historymatters.gmu.edu/d/5354/ (last visited June 1, 2021) [https://perma.cc/B5VB-ZDY8].
2.
See Hamza Shaban & Hannah Denham, What You Need to Know About GameStop’s Stock
POST
(Jan.
29,
2021),
Price
Chaos,
WASH.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2021/01/28/gamestop-stock-amc-reddit-faq/
[https://perma.cc/4GXW-XX36] (discussing the GameStop stock rally in early 2021); Alexis
Goldstein, The Trouble with GameStop Is That the House Still Wins, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 1, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/01/opinion/gamestop-biden-wall-street-reddit.html
[https://perma.cc/UW77-2MXX] (explaining power dynamics between Wall Street and retail
investors).
3.
See infra note 86 (providing resources on cryptocurrencies).
4.
See Catherine Clifford, Why Everyone Is Talking About Free Cash Handouts—An
Explainer on Universal Basic Income, CNBC: MAKE IT, https://www.cnbc.com/2019/06/27/free-cashhandouts-what-is-universal-basic-income-or-ubi.html (last updated Dec. 19, 2019, 3:31 PM)
[https://perma.cc/BW7R-A7TT] (explaining the concept of universal basic income).
BANKING
INST.,
5.
See
What
is
a
Public
Bank?,
PUB.
https://www.publicbankinginstitute.org/ (last visited June 1, 2021) [https://perma.cc/LDU8-FJY6]
(detailing the idea of a public bank); Anna Hrushka, Ocasio-Cortez, Tlaib-Backed Bill Would
Create Federally Chartered Public Banking System, BANKING DIVE (Nov. 2, 2020),
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manifestations of the broader quest for more equitable and inclusive
modes of finance.
Ultimately, however, it takes a system to beat a system.
This Article takes up the challenge of “beating” the currently
dysfunctional U.S. financial system by reimagining its fundamental
structure and redesigning its operation. It offers both a conceptual
framework for analyzing the core structural dynamics of today’s
finance, and a blueprint for reform that would radically democratize
access to money and control over financial flows in the
nation’s economy.
This effort is particularly urgent in the wake of the COVID-19
crisis that reenergized the long-standing academic and policy debate on
“democratizing finance.” 6 Among other things, the crisis amplified
recent calls to create free digital-dollar deposit accounts at the Federal
Reserve for every American household and business. 7 In essence, this
https://www.bankingdive.com/news/federally-chartered-public-banking-act-bill/588225/
[https://perma.cc/DWC4-VU8N] (discussing the details of public banking).
6.
For a sample of the existing literature on public banking, community finance, and other
aspects of “democratizing finance,” see generally LISA SERVON, THE UNBANKING OF AMERICA: HOW
THE NEW MIDDLE CLASS SURVIVES (2017); MEHRSA BARADARAN, HOW THE OTHER HALF BANKS:
EXCLUSION, EXPLOITATION, AND THE THREAT TO DEMOCRACY (2015); ELLEN BROWN, THE PUBLIC
BANK SOLUTION: FROM AUSTERITY TO PROSPERITY (2013); BUILDING INCLUSIVE FINANCIAL
SYSTEMS: A FRAMEWORK FOR FINANCIAL ACCESS (Michael S. Barr, Anjali Kumar & Robert E. Litan
eds., 2007); Michael S. Barr, Banking the Poor, 21 YALE J. ON REGUL. 121 (2004); ORGANIZING
ACCESS TO CAPITAL: ADVOCACY AND THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS (Gregory
D. Squires ed., 2003); ASSETS FOR THE POOR: THE BENEFITS OF SPREADING ASSET OWNERSHIP
(Thomas M. Shapiro & Edward N. Wolff eds., 2001); MICHAEL A. STEGMAN, SAVINGS FOR THE POOR:
THE HIDDEN BENEFITS OF ELECTRONIC BANKING (1999); JULIA ANN PARZEN & MICHAEL HALL
KIESCHNICK, CREDIT WHERE IT’S DUE: DEVELOPMENT BANKING FOR COMMUNITIES (1992); and
MICHAEL SHERRADEN, ASSETS AND THE POOR: A NEW AMERICAN WELFARE POLICY (1991).
7.
See Morgan Ricks, John Crawford & Lev Menand, Central Banking for All: A Public
DEMOCRACY
INITIATIVE
(June
2018),
Option
for
Bank
Accounts,
GREAT
https://greatdemocracyinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/FedAccountsGDI.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GVD8-PSHM] (calling for an option that allows the general public “to have a
bank account at the Federal Reserve”); see also Mike Konczal, A Federal Reserve Reform Agenda:
Eight Recommendations, ROOSEVELT INST. (Sept. 2020), https://rooseveltinstitute.org/wpcontent/uploads/2020/09/RI_FedDA_Working-Paper_202009.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VS3N-8CAJ]
(suggesting changes that the Federal Reserve should make to better serve the “country as a
whole”); Ameya Pawar, ‘Fed Accounts’ For All—With Automatic and Recurring Payments
(July
25,
2020),
Triggered
by
Economic
Crises,
MARKETWATCH
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/fed-accounts-for-all-with-automatic-and-recurringpayments-triggered-by-economic-crises-2020-07-21 [https://perma.cc/VRE7-XEH8] (arguing that
every American should receive a bank account at the Federal Reserve); Sylvan Lane, BidenSanders Unity Task Force Calls for Fed, US Postal Service Consumer Banking, HILL (July 8, 2020),
https://thehill.com/policy/finance/506469-biden-sanders-unity-task-force-calls-for-fed-us-postalservice-consumer [https://perma.cc/R8Q6-BBEF] (proposing the creation of a public bank);
Nikhilesh De, US Lawmakers Talk Digital Dollar, FedAccounts in Thursday Hearing, COINDESK
(June
10,
2020),
https://www.coindesk.com/watch-us-lawmakers-will-talk-digital-dollarfedaccounts-in-thursday-hearing [https://perma.cc/3C7A-SQR3] (discussing “FedAccounts” and
digital currencies).
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“FedAccounts” 8 idea represents an explicitly political—and consciously
progressive—take on the traditionally technocratic proposals to issue
central bank digital currency (“CBDC”). 9 Generally, the discourse on
CBDC is preoccupied mainly with operationalizing potential changes in
central bank liabilities, rather than situating them within the broader
institutional critique. Framed as a matter of “fast payments” and/or
“access to banking,” it is not grounded in a coherent vision of how the
financial system operates—and, more importantly, how it should
operate. 10 Without such a unifying vision, the true transformative
potential of changing central banks’ mode of interaction with the
broader public remains unexplored and underappreciated.
This Article resets the debate and offers a holistic, integrative
approach to institutional change. It advocates comprehensive reform of
the structure and function of the central bank’s balance sheet as the
basis for redesigning the core architecture of modern finance.
Deliberately ambitious in scope and substance, this proposal defines the
frontier of reform possibilities and throws into sharp relief what is
really at stake in this process.
Conceptually, the Article starts by placing the idea of
“democratizing finance” in the context of a broader evolution of the
central bank’s role in today’s system of public-private “franchise”
finance. 11 In this system, the Fed acts on behalf of the sovereign public
as the ultimate creator of a unique collective good: the monetized full
faith and credit of the United States. In a franchise-like arrangement,
the Fed modulates the supply of sovereign credit-money but outsources
the economy-wide allocation of this precious resource to specially
licensed and regulated private financial institutions: banks. 12
Accordingly, the Fed’s balance sheet is designed to function as a classic
“franchisor ledger”: its deposit liabilities primarily run to franchiseebanks, and its assets primarily comprise federal government-backed
debt and assets acquired in the course of providing liquidity support to
private financial institutions. In this paradigm, there is no direct
relationship between the central bank and the real people participating
in the real economy.
8.
See Ricks et al., supra note 7, at 1 (coining the term).
9.
See infra Part II.B (discussing CBDC). FedAccounts can be created without concurrent
CBDC issuance. In fact, the original proposal to open the Fed’s deposit services to the public dates
back to 1985, long before CBDC entered the scene. See infra note 112 and accompanying text
(referring to James Tobin’s proposal to allow individuals to have accounts at the central bank).
10. See infra Part II.B.
11. See infra Part I.A.
12. See infra Part I.A. For a full articulation of this argument, see Robert C. Hockett & Saule
T. Omarova, The Finance Franchise, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 1143 (2017) [hereinafter Finance
Franchise].
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This Article argues that a truly systemic democratization of
finance demands a structural shift at the very core of this arrangement.
The Article’s central claim is that, to achieve this goal, the Fed’s entire
balance sheet should be redesigned to operate as what it calls the
“People’s Ledger”: the ultimate public platform for both modulating and
allocating the flow of sovereign credit and money in the
national economy.
On the liability side, the Article envisions the ultimate “endstate” whereby central bank accounts fully replace—rather than
compete with—private bank deposits. 13 Making this explicit
assumption helps to illuminate and explore the full range of new
monetary policy options enabled by the compositional change in the
Fed’s liabilities. 14 As part of this exploratory exercise, the Article
proposes a mechanism for modulating the aggregate supply of money
via direct crediting—and, in rare circumstances, debiting—of
universally held FedAccounts. 15 It shows how this unconventional
mechanism, colloquially known as “helicopter money,” would empower
the Fed to conduct monetary policy in a far more targeted, dynamic,
and effective manner than can be done via interest rate
management alone. 16
On the asset side, the Article lays out a proposal for
restructuring the Fed’s investment portfolio and redirecting its creditallocation power in qualitatively new ways. 17 Under this proposal, the
Fed’s principal asset holdings would fall into three categories: (1)
redesigned “discount window” loans to qualifying lenders; (2) securities
issued by existing and newly created public instrumentalities for
purposes of financing large-scale public infrastructure projects; and (3)
an expanded portfolio of trading assets maintained for purposes of
financial-market stabilization. 18 Together, these new investment
choices would empower the Fed to channel greater quantities of credit

13. See infra Part III.A.
14. While using conventional accounting categories, this Article does not express a view on
whether FedAccounts, as a form of central bank money, are properly characterized as “liabilities”
of the Fed. For an in-depth analysis, see Michael Kumhof, Jason Allen, Will Bateman, Rosa Lastra,
Simon Gleeson & Saule T. Omarova, Central Bank Money: Liability, Asset, or Equity of the Nation?
(Cornell
L.
Sch.,
Working
Paper
No.
20-46,
2020),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3730608 [https://perma.cc/M5YF-Z9JR].
15. To avoid unnecessary multiplication of proprietary terminology describing what is
essentially a generic instrument, this Article adopts the popular term “FedAccounts,” coined by
Ricks et al., supra note 7, at 1.
16. See infra Part III.A.
17. See infra Part IV.A.
18. See infra Part IV.A.
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to productive uses in the real economy far more directly and effectively
than it can hope to do today.
Redesigning the Fed’s assets and liabilities, as proposed in this
Article, would optimize and increase its operational transparency.
Thus, the liability side of the Fed’s balance sheet would reflect all of its
key monetary policy choices and their outcomes, leaving the asset side
free to serve as the tool of the economy-wide credit allocation. This clean
functional delineation, which does not exist today, would enable the Fed
to formulate, implement, and dynamically adjust its policy priorities in
a more targeted and publicly accountable manner. 19
More fundamentally, the proposed restructuring of the Fed’s
balance sheet would democratize not only access to financial services
but also the very process of generation and allocation of financial
resources. It would therefore directly impact not only the banking
industry but also “shadow banking” and capital markets. The Article
shows how the two sides of the proposed reform—full migration of
deposits onto the Fed’s books and accompanying restructuring of its
asset portfolio—would drastically reduce the scale and systemically
destabilizing effects of speculative trading in financial instruments. It
would make financial markets less complex, more stable, and more
manageable sites of truly private risk-taking. 20 In effect, putting the
People’s Ledger in action would restore the socially efficient balance
between private intermediation and public generation of credit. It would
reprogram the financial system to support productive economic activity
and to serve the needs of the American people.
Of course, the practical implementation of this multilayered
structural reform would require more granular thinking about various
legal, political, and technological issues beyond this Article’s scope. The
purpose here is to advance a programmatic vision in order to bring
greater clarity and cohesion into the ongoing debate on the future of
finance in a democratic society. In that sense, the Article is a
synthesizing and agenda-setting exercise. It defines the realm of
structural possibilities that routinely go unnoticed and explores the
outer boundaries of potential institutional change partially—and
quietly—embedded within many CBDC and “public banking”
proposals. 21 As these ideas gain broader acceptance in the public policy
debate, it is increasingly important that we understand where those

19. For a description of the Fed’s current mix of monetary policy tools, see infra Part I.B.
20. See infra Part V.
21. See supra notes 5–9; Part II.B.
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boundaries are, how far we are prepared to go, and what choices await
us on that path. 22
It is especially important to recognize that taking a more
limited, piecemeal approach to reform is not necessarily the most
prudent or practically feasible option. As this Article shows, there is an
inherently symbiotic relationship between central banks’ assets and
liabilities as tools of financial and economic statecraft. Translating this
insight into policy requires an integrated and proactive approach to
restructuring both sides of the central bank’s ledger. Despite its builtin modularity, the People’s Ledger proposal operationalizes this unified
approach. It underscores the transformative—and publicly beneficial—
system-wide effects of a comprehensive overhaul, as opposed to
incremental tweaks, of the Fed’s balance sheet. By contrast, proposals
that seek to expand central bank liabilities, while minimizing potential
disruption of the existing institutional arrangements, forfeit these
essential benefits. 23 From this perspective, the overtly radical reform
outlined here is ultimately a more pragmatic and sensible response to
the challenge of democratizing finance.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I sets the conceptual
context for the proposal by defining the “franchisor ledger” model of the
central bank balance sheet built into today’s financial system. Part II
examines how the COVID-19 crisis effectively pushed the Fed beyond
the traditional confines of the “franchisor ledger” paradigm. Parts III
and IV lay out the core proposal for transforming the Fed’s balance
sheet into the People’s Ledger. Part III outlines the FedAccounts
scheme and explores the potential expansion of the Fed’s monetary
policy tools. Part IV proposes a fundamental restructuring of the Fed’s
asset portfolio, which would enable the Fed to take a more direct and
proactive role in allocating credit to productive economic enterprise.
Finally, Part V traces the key effects of the proposed reforms on the
structure and operation of the U.S. banking industry and money and
capital markets.

22. This conceptual and normative framing is one important factor distinguishing this Article
from my colleague Bob Hockett’s recent proposals to create a Treasury Dollar or a Democratic
Digital Dollar, issued respectively by the Treasury or by the Fed, with the goal of complete
institutional fusion of the U.S. fiscal and monetary policies. See, e.g., Robert Hockett, The Capital
Commons: A Plan for Building Back Better and Beyond (Cornell L. Sch., Working Paper No. 124,
2020),
https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1127&context=clsops_papers
[https://perma.cc/V24H-FRVY] (proposing a version of digital dollar payments system).
23. See infra Part II.B.
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I. THE CENTRAL BANK BALANCE SHEET IN “FRANCHISE” FINANCE: AN
OVERVIEW
This Part provides a brief conceptual overview of the central
bank’s role in the modern system of public-private “franchise” finance.
Focusing on the Federal Reserve, it shows how the underlying dynamics
of this hybrid system shape the structure and functions of the central
bank’s balance sheet—the “franchisor ledger”—and define its
principal limitations.
A. Franchise Finance: The Logic of the System
The current U.S. financial system is in essence a public-private
franchise arrangement for the distribution of a unique collective good:
the monetized full faith and credit of the United States. 24 At its core, it
is a system for supplying and dispensing a uniform national currency
and its credit equivalent, dollar-denominated debt. 25 The sovereign
public, acting through its central bank and fiscal authorities, is the
ultimate creator, or issuer, of this critical collective good. 26 Privately
owned banks and other financial institutions, in turn, distribute
sovereign credit-money throughout the economy, effectively collecting
“privatized seigniorage” for their services. 27 To ensure the uniformity of
the sovereign credit-money administered by these private franchisees,
the sovereign franchisor promulgates and enforces strict licensing and
regulatory measures—a form of “quality control” critical to the integrity
of the arrangement. 28
These basic, though routinely underappreciated, dynamics are
most clearly evident in the operation of commercial banks that extend
credit by opening new, or crediting existing, deposits for their
borrowers. 29 The borrowers can immediately spend these privately
generated bank deposits as if they were full equivalents of Federal
Reserve notes, this country’s legal tender. While widely taken for
granted, this functional equivalence is a product of the institutional
24. This Part builds on the in-depth account of the U.S. financial system in Finance
Franchise, supra note 12.
25. Most of this debt takes the form of what is called “credit-money,” “bank money,” “deposit
money,” or “broad money.”
26. For a discussion of “collective goods,” see Robert C. Hockett & Saule T. Omarova, Private
Wealth and Public Goods: A Case for a National Investment Authority, 43 J. CORP. L. 437 (2018)
[hereinafter National Investment Authority].
27. Examples of privatized seigniorage include interest and other fees financial institutions
charge for lending and managing money. Finance Franchise, supra note 12, at 1163.
28. Id. at 1161.
29. See id. at 1158–64 (explaining how banks create deposits by extending loans).
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design that makes banks the key nodes in the national payments
infrastructure, administered and fully backed by the Fed.
Thus, contrary to the widespread misconception, banks do not
simply “intermediate” between private savers and borrowers by lending
to the latter what the former have previously deposited. 30 In practice,
banks create deposits when they extend loans to creditworthy
customers, as simply the liability-side entry offsetting the newly
created asset on the bank’s balance sheet. 31 The real key to the
spendability of these newly loaned funds as deposit-account “bank
money” is, therefore, not their fictitious derivation from some privately
pre-accumulated capital, but an act of the sovereign: the Fed
accommodation and monetization of bank-created private liabilities. 32
It is an institutionalized precommitment by the Fed to recognize and
support the continuous clearing and settlement, through the public
payments infrastructure that the Fed administers, of payments drawn
upon deposit accounts maintained with publicly licensed
banking institutions. 33
That license is the bank charter, which functions essentially as
a franchise contract whose terms include mandatory reserve and capital
buffers, qualitative and quantitative restrictions on banks’ asset
portfolios, regular reporting and on-site examination requirements, and
other familiar elements of modern bank regulation. 34 These “quality
control” measures are designed to maintain the stability of the
franchisee-banks, minimize the moral hazard built into this
arrangement, and prevent overissuance of money in relation to the
quantum of goods and services produced in the economy. 35
In recent decades, this privileged access to public
accommodation has steadily expanded beyond the formal confines of the
banking system. In large part, this loosening of the franchise border
reflects an increasingly complex pattern of intentionally cultivated
transactional and structural linkages between nonbank financial
institutions, on the one hand, and commercial banks, on the other. 36 As
30. Id. at 1159.
31. For a full analysis, see id. at 1153–64.
32. Id. at 1155–57.
33. See id. (discussing the process of central bank accommodation and monetization of bank
liabilities).
34. For textbook summaries of the key elements of U.S. bank regulation and supervision, see
generally MICHAEL S. BARR, HOWELL E. JACKSON & MARGARET E. TAHYAR, FINANCIAL
REGULATION: LAW AND POLICY (2d ed. 2018); and RICHARD SCOTT CARNELL, JONATHAN R. MACEY
& GEOFFREY P. MILLER, THE LAW OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS (6th ed. 2017).
35. See Finance Franchise, supra note 12, at 1161 (discussing regulatory tools).
36. The key legislation that enabled these structural shifts was the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act
of 1999, which repealed the Depression-era prohibition on affiliations between commercial banks
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a result, nonbank financial institutions—securities firms, derivatives
dealers, asset managers, and other participants in the capital markets
and so-called “shadow banking” sector—have now become de facto
franchisees that issue and multiply public credit-money alongside
commercial banks. 37
They do so via a complex web of transactional mechanisms and
techniques that either amplify the quantity of bank credit (by
generating demand for it), or functionally replicate the money-creation
function reserved for regulated banks—or both. 38 The key to these
amplification and replication dynamics is the direct or indirect central
bank accommodation of private liabilities issued by these “rogue”
franchisees operating outside of the original franchise arrangement.
Money market mutual funds (“MMMFs”), bespoke derivative
instruments, securities repurchase (“repo”) markets, and complex
securitizations all exemplify these dynamics and illustrate their
potentially destabilizing systemic effects. 39
B. The Fed’s Balance Sheet as the “Franchisor Ledger”
In the franchise model of finance, described above, the sovereign
public must issue and modulate the supply of sovereign credit-money.
This Article argues that, in addition, it can and should allocate the
critical quantity of that vital resource. 40 In fact, asserting the public’s
primary role in allocating publicly issued money and credit is critical to
its ability to perform the modulatory task effectively—and to solving
ubiquitous, self-reinforcing collective action problems that create
financial instability and hinder socially equitable economic growth. 41
A central bank’s balance sheet is the ultimate platform—the
ledger—on which the sovereign public can perform these core functions
and ensure the continuous flow of capital throughout the economy. The
composition of that ledger both reflects and determines the overall
structure of monetary relations and the broader power dynamics in the
financial system. Significant changes in the composition of the Fed’s
and securities firms. Banking Act of 1933 (Glass-Steagall Act), Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.), repealed in part by Financial Services
Modernization Act of 1999 (Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act), Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.); see also Finance Franchise, supra note 12,
at 1193–1201 (discussing the impact of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act).
37. See Finance Franchise, supra note 12, at 1165–1202 (discussing the role of “shadow
banking” in the finance franchise system).
38. Id. at 1193.
39. For a detailed exercise tracing these dynamics, see id. at 1188–93; and infra Part V.B.
40. For a fully articulated argument, see Finance Franchise, supra note 12.
41. See infra Part IV.
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balance sheet, accordingly, reveal important structural shifts in the
U.S. financial system and the broader political economy.
Under the current franchise arrangement, the central bank’s
balance sheet functions as the quintessential franchisor ledger. Prior to
2008, the Fed’s balance sheet was structured in close conformity with
this baseline model: its main liabilities ran to franchisee entities, and
the bulk of its asset holdings were in the form of federal government
debt instruments. Since the 2008 crisis, the Fed’s balance sheet has
been undergoing significant changes, both quantitative and qualitative.
To understand the full systemic importance of these ongoing
shifts in the structure and operation of the Fed’s balance sheet,
however, it is helpful to start by examining the baseline logic of the
franchisor ledger.
1. The Liability Side
In accordance with the franchisor ledger model, the liability side
of the Fed’s balance sheet generally consists of its notes (U.S. paper
currency), commercial banks’ reserve accounts, and repo and “swap
line” liabilities to dealer-banks and foreign central banks. 42
This brief description readily reveals an important feature of a
modern central bank’s business model. Except for the paper currency,
the Fed’s liabilities run solely to public instrumentalities and privately
owned financial institutions with the privileged franchisee status. Key
among such liabilities are reserve accounts held by U.S. banks. 43 The
Fed uses these accounts to impose and enforce its mandatory reserve
requirements and liquidity management regime applicable to all banks
chartered or operating in the United States. 44 Because reserve accounts
are effectively deposits, they are accounted for as the Fed’s liabilities

42. See Federal Reserve Liabilities, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RSRV. SYS.,
https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/bst_frliabilities.htm (last updated Dec. 27, 2018)
[https://perma.cc/9CQW-2MWQ] (listing the liabilities of the Federal Reserve).
43. See 12 U.S.C. § 342 (allowing banks to make deposits with the Fed); see also id. § 391
(allowing the Treasury to make deposits with the Fed); id. § 1435 (allowing the Federal Home Loan
Banks to make deposits with the Fed); id. § 347d (allowing governments, banks, and central banks
of foreign countries to make deposits with the Fed); id. § 5465 (allowing designated financial
market utilities to make deposits with the Fed).
44. As of March 31, 2020, the Fed held roughly $2.5 trillion in commercial bank deposits. BD.
OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RSRV. SYS., FEDERAL RESERVE BANKS COMBINED QUARTERLY
FINANCIAL
REPORT
(UNAUDITED)
3
(Mar.
31,
2020),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/files/quarterly-report-20200528.pdf
[https://perma.cc/G8JM-9ER8].
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that appear as assets on banks’ balance sheets. 45 In this direct sense,
the Federal Reserve is designed to be a “banks’ bank”—a central bank.
In the post-2008 era, this narrowly restricted structure of the
Fed’s liabilities has been increasingly subject to criticism along three
principal lines. First, the present arrangement overtly privileges
certain financial institutions—especially “big” ones—by giving them a
safe and lucrative “public banking option” not available to other firms
and individual Americans. This asymmetry became particularly visible
in the wake of the 2008 crisis, when the Fed started paying its bankdepositors so-called “Interest on Reserves” (“IOR”). 46 From the Fed’s
perspective, IOR serves as a liability-side tool of monetary policy.
However, it also generates a gratuitous rent for banks, which they do
not pass on to their own depositors in the form of equivalent interest on
deposits. 47 It is this “special-privilege” aspect of the IOR regime that
attracts criticism as fundamentally inequitable and exclusionary. 48
Second, the present arrangement allows private franchiseeinstitutions to over-generate publicly accommodated credit, thereby
fueling financial market volatility and causing systematic
misallocation of capital to speculative activities. 49 This “roguefranchisee” problem was on full display in the years before the 2008
financial crisis, aided by the Fed’s failure to perform its core
“quality-control” responsibilities. 50
Third, conducting monetary policy through a layer of private
bank-intermediaries is inherently inefficient. The Fed’s experience with
“quantitative easing” (“QE”) and other extraordinary measures
designed to keep bank credit flowing during and after the 2008 crisis

45. But cf. Kumhof et al., supra note 14 (arguing that central bank money is more accurately
characterized as a form of “social equity” rather than a traditional liability).
46. Congress authorized IOR in the Financial Services Regulatory Relief Act of 2006, Pub. L.
No. 109-351, §§ 201, 203, 120 Stat. 1966, 1968–69 (authorizing the Fed to start paying IOR in
2011) and the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, § 128, 122 Stat.
3765, 3796 (accelerating the authorized commencement date to October 1, 2008). See also Ann
Saphir, Yellen Draws Fire for Fed Policy to Pay Banks, REUTERS (Feb. 10, 2016, 2:01 PM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/usa-fed-yellen-politics/yellen-draws-fire-for-fed-policy-to-paybanks-idUSL2N15P1Z7 [https://perma.cc/35A6-H2V3].
47. What makes this rent possible is the indispensability of transaction accounts. Supplying
these transaction accounts publicly will eliminate the basis for this and many other rent-extraction
opportunities. See infra Part III.
48. See Is the Federal Reserve Giving Banks a $12Bn Subsidy?, ECONOMIST (Mar. 18, 2017),
https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2017/03/18/is-the-federal-reserve-givingbanks-a-12bn-subsidy [https://perma.cc/3KW7-PNML] (discussing the IOR regime).
49. For a detailed account of these dynamics, see Finance Franchise, supra note 12.
50. Id. at 1214; see also Lev Menand, Too Big to Supervise: The Rise of Financial
Conglomerates and the Decline of Discretionary Oversight in Banking, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 1527
(2019) (detailing the gradual erosion of the Fed’s “quality control” standards).
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exposed these structural inefficiencies. 51 Thus, despite the Fed’s efforts,
many banks preferred either to hoard their additional liquidity or to use
it for potentially more lucrative trading in secondary financial
markets. 52 The persistently depressed demand for loans in the postcrash economy further magnified the Fed’s infamous “pushing on a
string” problem. 53
2. The Asset Side
The bulk of the Fed’s assets traditionally consists of Treasury
bonds and so-called “agency securities”—low-risk bonds issued by
federal government agencies and government-sponsored enterprises
(“GSEs”). 54 Other typical items on the asset side of its balance sheet
include gold certificates, Special Drawing Rights (“SDRs”) with the
International Monetary Fund (“IMF”), foreign currencies, so-called
“discount window” loans, and similar assets acquired in the course of
providing liquidity support to qualifying financial institutions. 55
The Federal Reserve has traditionally used the asset side of its
balance sheet to conduct monetary policy. Thus, in addition to bank
reserve requirements and IOR, the Fed uses discount window lending
to set the so-called “discount rate.” 56 The discount window is the
primary facility through which the Fed provides liquidity support to
commercial banks experiencing short-term liquidity problems and
unable to borrow in the interbank market. 57 Discount window loans
51. See infra notes 62–65 and accompanying text (discussing the Fed’s role as a “market
maker”).
52. Mark Blyth, The Last Days of Pushing on a String, HARV. BUS. REV. (Aug. 7, 2012),
https://hbr.org/2012/08/the-last-days-of-pushing-on-a [https://perma.cc/7QJ2-Q78B].
53. Id. The “pushing on a string” metaphor refers to the asymmetric efficacy of a central
bank’s monetary policy: while raising interest rates can relatively easily counteract inflationary
pressures, lowering the rates does not necessarily produce the desired economic stimulus. This
phrase was used during congressional hearings where the Fed Chair, Marriner Eccles, testified on
the proposed Banking Act of 1935. See Banking Act of 1935: Hearing on H.R. 5357 Before the H.
Comm. on Banking & Currency, 74th Cong. 377 (1935) (statement of Marriner Eccles, Chairman,
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System) (using the analogy to a commonly known fact
that “one cannot push a string”).
54. See
James
Chen,
Agency
Security,
INVESTOPEDIA,
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/a/agencysecurities.asp (last updated Apr. 10, 2021)
[https://perma.cc/FW7C-8NQR].
55. FED. RSRV. BANKS, COMBINED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AS OF AND FOR THE YEARS ENDED
DECEMBER 31, 2018 AND 2017 AND INDEPENDENT AUDITORS’ REPORT 3 (2019),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/files/combinedfinstmt2018.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZH9Q-3QNG].
56. See The Discount Window and Discount Rate, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RSRV. SYS.,
https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/discountrate.htm (last updated May 25, 2021)
[https://perma.cc/6ESY-ZU97].
57. See Discount Window Lending, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RSRV. SYS.,
https://www.federalreserve.gov/regreform/discount-window.htm (last updated Mar. 31, 2021)
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enable the Fed to monetize, directly or indirectly, certain high-quality
assets deemed worthy of monetization in the interest of maintaining
systemic liquidity or encouraging the flow of credit to specific areas of
economic activity. 58
Even more significantly, the Federal Reserve regularly engages
in so-called “open market operations” (“OMO”) 59 by selling and
purchasing Treasury bonds and entering into “repo” and “reverse repo”
transactions. 60 Along with IOR, the Fed’s OMO and repo operations
serve as the means of keeping the key “federal funds rate”—the interest
rate at which banks lend to one another overnight—around the target
established by the Federal Open Markets Committee (“FOMC”). 61
All of these tools utilize the Fed’s asset portfolio as the means of
performing its traditional money-modulatory task. Since 2008,
however, some of these tools also have been used in pursuit of the creditallocative task. The third round of the Fed’s quantitative easing
(“QE3”), which began in the fall of 2012, is a good example of this trend.
Under QE3, the Fed committed to purchasing $85 billion per month in
mortgage-related assets in order to maintain a floor under housing
prices. 62 It was a direct continuation of the Fed’s massive emergency
lending and liquidity-support programs instituted in response to the
crisis of 2008. 63 In effect, the crisis turned the Fed into the “market
[https://perma.cc/PL3S-BNZ2] (explaining discount window lending); see also 12 U.S.C. § 347b
(authorizing the Fed to make advances to banks).
58. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RSRV. SYS., supra note 57; see also Operating Circular
No. 10, FED. RSRV. BANKS (2013),
https://www.frbservices.org/assets/resources/rulesregulations/071613-operating-circular-10.pdf [https://perma.cc/VQC9-9R38] (setting the terms of
Fed discount window lending).
59. Open Market Operations, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RSRV. SYS.,
https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/bst_openmarketops.htm (last updated May 10,
2021) [https://perma.cc/QU5Z-8LRX].
60. “Repo” is an abbreviated term for securities repurchase agreements, the functional
equivalent of short-term loans secured by liquid financial instruments; a “reverse repo” is a repo
transaction from the cash lender’s viewpoint. See Repo and Reverse Repo Agreements, FED. RSRV.
BANK OF N.Y., https://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/domestic-market-operations/monetarypolicy-implementation/repo-reverse-repo-agreements
(last
visited
June
5,
2021)
[https://perma.cc/K5VL-H8ND].
61. Open Market Operations, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RSRV. SYS.,
https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/openmarket.htm (last updated Mar. 16, 2020)
[https://perma.cc/8ND4-VH2T].
62. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., Federal Reserve Issues FOMC
Statement
(Sept.
13,
2012),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20120913a.htm
[https://perma.cc/4TVJ-7H2l].
63. See Robin Greenwood, Samuel G. Hanson & Jeremy C. Stein, The Federal Reserve’s
Balance Sheet as a Financial-Stability Tool, in INNOVATIVE FEDERAL RESERVE POLICIES DURING
THE GREAT FINANCIAL CRISIS 63 (Douglas D. Evanoff, George G. Kaufman & A. G. Malliaris eds.,
2016). For a recent analysis of the Fed’s QE operations as a source of financial support for the U.S.
Treasury through remittance payments and “reinvestment” programs, see Will Bateman, The Law
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maker of last resort,” 64 whose dramatically expanded portfolio of assets
included such qualitatively new asset classes as privately issued
mortgage instruments and swap lines provided to foreign
central banks. 65
These large-scale, crisis-driven interventions explain the
remarkable growth in the size of the Fed’s balance sheet. 66
Nevertheless, both the quantitative growth of, and qualitative changes
to, the Fed’s asset portfolio in the post-2008 era were straightforward
extensions of traditional Fed operations into new market segments or
levels of magnitude. Though often controversial, they gradually became
accepted as necessary crisis-containment measures. 67 The COVID-19
pandemic, however, has pushed the Fed’s market operations
significantly beyond their traditional confines. By forcing the Fed much
deeper into the realm of direct credit allocation, this latest crisis
exposed the inherent limitations of the twentieth-century “franchisor
ledger” model of central banking in today’s world.
II. THE FRANCHISOR LEDGER AT ITS LIMIT: THE IMPACT OF COVID-19
In early 2020, the global spread of the novel coronavirus
triggered a major public health crisis in the United States. Drastic
virus-containment measures, in turn, led to a wave of business closures
and dramatic rise in unemployment levels. 68 Once again, the Federal

of Monetary Finance under Unconventional Monetary Policy, OXFORD J.L. STUD. (forthcoming
2021)
(manuscript
at
10–13,
20–22,
27–29),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8083242/pdf/gqab008.pdf/?tool=EBI
[https://perma.cc/RNV9-3DCZ].
64. Willem Buiter & Anne Sibert, The Central Bank as the Market Maker of Last Resort: From
Lender of Last Resort to Market Maker of Last Resort, VOXEU (Aug. 13, 2007),
https://voxeu.org/article/subprime-crisis-what-central-bankers-should-do-and-why
[https://perma.cc/MM2S-7PFD] (discussing central banks’ market-making role during crises).
65. See Colleen Baker, The Federal Reserve’s Use of International Swap Lines, 55 ARIZ. L.
REV. 603, 608 (2013) (discussing central bank “swap lines” in 2008); PERRY MEHRLING, THE NEW
LOMBARD STREET: HOW THE FED BECAME THE DEALER OF LAST RESORT (2011) (explaining the
history surrounding central bank “swap lines”).
66. The Fed’s total assets increased from $870 billion in August 2007 to $4.5 trillion in early
2015. As of December 30, 2019, that number stood at approximately $4.2 trillion. Recent Balance
OF
GOVERNORS
OF
THE
FED.
RSRV.
SYS.,
Sheet
Trends,
BD.
https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/bst_recenttrends.htm (last updated June 4, 2021)
[https://perma.cc/5BAE-HFEK].
67. This fact came into a sharp relief in September 2019, when the Fed significantly ramped
up its repo operations to inject liquidity into money markets. Sriya Anbil, Alyssa Anderson &
Zeynep Senyuz, What Happened in Money Markets in September 2019?, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE
FED. RSRV. SYS. (Feb. 27, 2020), https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/notes/feds-notes/whathappened-in-money-markets-in-september-2019-20200227.htm [https://perma.cc/DKC9-6H3D].
68. For official unemployment data, see Effects of COVID-19 Pandemic on the Employment
Situation News Release and Data, U.S. BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., https://www.bls.gov/covid19/effects-
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Reserve’s balance sheet became the critical tool of saving the economy
from collapse. Given the enormity of the challenge, however, the Fed’s
usual crisis-time operations as the lender and market maker of last
resort quickly took on a qualitatively new dimension. For the first time,
the Fed began massive direct purchases of corporate debt and opened a
credit line for municipalities—extraordinary measures that brought
into a sharp relief central banks’ fundamentally allocative role,
normally obscured from public view. On the other side of the ledger, the
pandemic has reignited the movement to democratize the Fed by giving
all American households and businesses direct access to central bank
money. This Part examines these ongoing pressures on the Fed’s
balance sheet—and their potential to hasten the demise of the
traditional “franchisor ledger” paradigm of central banking.
A. The Asset Side: “Whatever It Takes”
Although the COVID-19 crisis did not originate in the financial
sector, the response to the crisis quickly became a matter of getting
finance flowing throughout the abruptly incapacitated economic
system. On March 27, 2020, Congress passed the CARES Act that,
among other things, appropriated a $500 billion emergency relief
package to be used by the Treasury for purposes of providing financial
assistance to eligible U.S. businesses and public entities. 69 In the
familiar crisis response mode, the Fed’s balance sheet became the
principal platform for injecting emergency relief funds into the lockeddown economy. With the Treasury providing first-loss protection, the
Federal Reserve established several new lending programs to facilitate
the flow of credit to U.S. companies and certain public entities. 70
Some of these facilities replicated the emergency programs used
to stem the financial crisis in 2008–2009. 71 Much like in that earlier
crisis, the Fed used these programs to inject liquidity into the financial
system by bolstering financial institutions’ balance sheets. Several
facilities, however, were established for the first time and aimed to
of-covid-19-pandemic-and-response-on-the-employment-situation-news-release.htm (last updated
June 4, 2021) [https://perma.cc/MBU2-M9JS].
69. Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136, 134
Stat. 281 (2020).
70. See Funding, Credit, Liquidity, and Loan Facilities, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED.
RSRV. SYS., https://www.federalreserve.gov/funding-credit-liquidity-and-loan-facilities.htm (last
updated Apr. 12, 2021) [https://perma.cc/9URS-XQXF] (providing detailed information on
emergency lending facilities set up in response to COVID-19).
71. These include the Primary Dealer Credit Facility (“PDCF”), Commercial Paper Funding
Facility (“CPFF”), Money Market Fund Liquidity Facility (“MMLF”), and Term Asset-Backed
Securities Loan Facility (“TALF”). Id.
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provide credit not to banks and other financial institutions but to a wide
range of commercial businesses and state and municipal governments.
The Fed created two Corporate Credit Facilities—the Primary
Market Corporate Credit Facility (“PMCCF”) 72 and the Secondary
Market Corporate Credit Facility (“SMCCF”) 73—to purchase qualifying
corporate loans and bonds both in secondary markets and in primary
issuances. Intended to help otherwise healthy U.S. companies avoid
massive employee layoffs, these programs were established under
Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act, which governs the Fed’s
emergency nonbank lending. 74 The SMCCF supported market liquidity
by purchasing corporate bonds of qualifying companies and exchangetraded fund shares. 75 Even more radically, the PMCCF gave U.S.
corporations direct access to government funding to enable them to
maintain business operations during the pandemic. 76
In another unusual move, the Fed has established the Municipal
Lending Facility (“MLF”) to help state and local governments manage
cash flow pressures and continue serving their communities. 77 Under
this program, eligible states, cities, and various local government
entities were allowed to borrow directly from the Federal Reserve,
subject to certain conditions. 78 The program’s strict eligibility
requirements, relatively high interest rates, and other conditions
significantly limited its practical use and efficacy and made it a target
of significant criticism. 79 Yet, despite its limitations, the MLF marked
the first time the Federal Reserve set up a high-profile credit facility to
72. Primary Market Corporate Credit Facility, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RSRV. SYS.,
https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/pmccf.htm (last updated May 10, 2021)
[https://perma.cc/43KJ-Y6HG].
73. Secondary Market Corporate Credit Facility, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RSRV. SYS.,
https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/smccf.htm (last updated June 2, 2021)
[https://perma.cc/LDZ5-99RL].
74. 12 U.S.C. § 343. For an analysis of the Fed’s legal authority to establish these facilities,
see Lev Menand, The Federal Reserve and the 2020 Economic and Financial Crisis, 26 STAN. J.L.
BUS. & FIN. 295 (2021).
75. FAQs: Primary Market Corporate Credit Facility and Secondary Market Corporate Credit
Facility, FED. RSRV. BANK OF N.Y., https://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/primary-and-secondarymarket-faq/corporate-credit-facility-faq (last visited May 26, 2021) [https://perma.cc/EK4G-DC43].
The SMCCF purchases track a specially created Broad Market Index of eligible bonds. Id.
76. Id.
77. Policy Tools: Municipal Liquidity Facility, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RSRV. SYS.,
https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/muni.htm (last updated July 13, 2021)
[https://perma.cc/XS7Z-JWGU]. The MLF was established pursuant to the Fed’s authority under
Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act and became operational on May 26, 2020. See id.
78. Id.
79. See Robert Hockett, Community QE – Illinois Signs On, and Eligibility Further Expands,
but ‘Penalty Rates’ Still Have to Go, FORBES (June 5, 2020, 9:46 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/rhockett/2020/06/05/community-qe—illinois-signs-on-and-eligibilityfurther-expands-but-penalty-rates-still-gotta-go/#69c4f9d218f2 [https://perma.cc/F5W2-G7YN].
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support municipal bond markets and effectively put its own balance
sheet behind state and local governments. 80
Collectively, the Fed’s multiple emergency programs—doing
“whatever it takes” to prevent an economic disaster—had a tremendous
quantitative impact on its balance sheet. 81 By June 1, 2020, the Fed’s
total assets surpassed $7 trillion. 82 What is even more important for
present purposes, however, is the qualitative shift in the Fed’s asset
portfolio, especially as a result of its direct purchases of corporate and
municipal bonds. In effect, these recent changes in the composition of
the Fed’s assets reflect the ongoing changes in the role of a modern
central bank not only as the nation’s primary money modulator but
also, increasingly, as its credit allocator. Put simply, the latest crisis
made it no longer possible to ignore the fact that the central bank’s
balance sheet is an indispensable, integrated platform for ensuring the
functioning of the modern economy—and not simply the back-office
support system for private franchisee-banks.
B. The Liability Side: What’s Next?
To date, the qualitative changes on the asset side of the Fed’s
balance sheet have not been accompanied by similarly significant shifts
in the composition of its liabilities. Nevertheless, the pandemic has
created a significant new opening for potentially transformative
changes on the liability side of a modern central bank’s balance sheet.
In particular, the COVID-19 pandemic pushed two ideas into the
mainstream policy debate: (1) the issuance of CBDC; and (2) allowing
individuals to hold money on deposit directly at the central bank.
While intimately related, these two ideas are typically framed in
conceptually and normatively different terms and addressed to
different audiences. Thus, the CBDC discussions are confined primarily
to the technocratically minded central bankers and economic experts
concerned with the efficacy of monetary policy tools in the era of digital
finance. 83 By contrast, the “central banking for all” idea is based on an
80. Id. (using the term “Community QE” to emphasize this effect).
81. Neil Irwin, Fed Chair to Congress: Do Whatever It Takes to Keep the Economy from
TIMES:
THE
UPSHOT
(Apr.
29,
2020),
Collapse,
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/29/upshot/fed-powell-economy-pandemic.html
[https://perma.cc/3F59-3S8E]. This phrase was made famous in 2012 by Mario Draghi. Ian
Wishart, ECB ‘Will Do Whatever It Takes’ to Save the Euro, POLITICO (July 26, 2012, 9:53 AM),
https://www.politico.eu/article/ecb-will-do-whatever-it-takes-to-save-the-euro/
[https://perma.cc/9ZVJ-6U9E].
82. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RSRV. SYS., supra note 66.
83. For a summary of the CBDC debate, see Dirk Niepelt, Digital Money and Central Bank
Digital Currency: An Executive Summary for Policymakers, VOXEU (Feb. 3, 2020),
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overtly political appeal to the goals of financial inclusion and
democratizing access to financial services. 84
Issuing a new form of digitized central bank money, or CBDC,
became an increasingly hot topic of policy discussion as a result of the
rapid rise in the volume and popularity of privately issued
cryptocurrencies. 85 The success of Bitcoin paved the road for the
subsequent emergence of numerous crypto-assets purporting to
challenge the supremacy of sovereign money. 86 Recent growth of
“stablecoins,” privately issued crypto-assets whose value is explicitly
pegged to one or more sovereign currencies, presents a particularly
tangible challenge in this respect. 87 Not surprisingly, Facebook’s plans
to launch its own stablecoin, Libra (later renamed Diem), 88 immediately
heightened the salience of CBDC on central banks’ agendas. 89
The ongoing debate among central bankers and economists is
focused on the range of specific design options, both with respect to the
CBDC itself and the infrastructure for its provision and use. 90
Functionally, specific CBDC can differ in the degree of privacy and
anonymity, availability around the clock or during limited times, and
other user convenience features. Economically, CBDC may be
universally available (“retail” or “general-purpose”) or restricted to only
https://voxeu.org/article/digital-money-and-central-bank-digital-currency-executive-summary
[https://perma.cc/SJ6G-P4H2].
84. See infra notes 109–111 and accompanying text.
85. COMM. ON PAYMENTS & MKT. INFRASTRUCTURES & MKTS. COMM., BANK FOR INT’L
SETTLEMENTS,
CENTRAL
BANK
DIGITAL
CURRENCIES
3
(Mar.
2018),
https://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d174.pdf [https://perma.cc/HP7V-ET8K].
86. For more on Bitcoin and other crypto-assets, see PRIMAVERA DE FILIPPI & AARON WRIGHT,
BLOCKCHAIN AND THE LAW (2018); NATHANIEL POPPER, DIGITAL GOLD (2015); PAUL VIGNA &
MICHAEL J. CASEY, THE AGE OF CRYPTOCURRENCY: HOW BITCOIN AND DIGITAL MONEY ARE
CHALLENGING THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC ORDER (2015); and KEVIN WERBACH, THE BLOCKCHAIN AND
THE NEW ARCHITECTURE OF TRUST (2018).
87. See Mitsutoshi Adachi, Matteo Cominetta, Christoph Kaufmann & Anton van der Kraaij,
A Regulatory and Financial Stability Perspective on Global Stablecoins, EUR. CENT. BANK:
MACROPRUDENTIAL
BULL.
(May
5,
2020),
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/financialstability/macroprudential-bulletin/html/ecb.mpbu202005_1~3e9ac10eb1.en.html
[https://perma.cc/XK5X-YY2R]; Douglas Arner, Raphael Auer & Jon Frost, Stablecoins: Risks,
Potential and Regulation (Bank for Int’l Settlements, Working Paper No. 905, 2020),
https://www.bis.org/publ/work905.pdf [https://perma.cc/6HNP-RE2J].
88. See Libra Association, White Paper, DIEM (Apr. 2020), https://www.diem.com/en-us/whitepaper/ [https://perma.cc/N2WX-MXKC] (detailing Facebook’s plan).
89. Issaku Harada, Digital Yuan Nears Launch as China Sweats over Libra, NIKKEI ASIA
(Dec. 3, 2019, 6:37), https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Markets/Currencies/Digital-yuan-nearslaunch-as-China-sweats-over-Libra [https://perma.cc/B3TZ-D4V8]; Tim Alper, Digital Yuan
Rollout
Is
‘Response
to
Facebook’s
Libra,’
CRYPTONEWS
(May
26,
2020),
https://cryptonews.com/news/digital-yuan-rollout-is-response-to-facebook-s-libra-6635.htm
[https://perma.cc/22VD-E3BW].
90. Central Bank Digital Currency: Opportunities, Challenges, and Design, BANK OF ENG. 11
(2020),
https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/paper/2020/central-bank-digitalcurrency-opportunities-challenges-and-design.pdf [https://perma.cc/6ATU-RMDB].
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financial institutions (“wholesale”), be interest-bearing or not, be
subject to quantitative limits or unlimited, and have varying levels of
convertibility into cash or bank deposits. 91 Finally, choices related to
the provision of CBDC concern the allocation of roles and
responsibilities between central banks and private financial firms
(banks, payment processors, etc.). 92
Different design choices along each of these lines determine the
technological requirements and trade-offs associated with a particular
form of CBDC. 93 The core issues in the debate surrounding these
choices, however, involve substantive policy implications of CBDC
issuance. 94 On the one hand, the general consensus among economic
experts is that CBDC would expand and sharpen central banks’
monetary policy tool kit by allowing them to manage interest rates more
directly via interest on CBDC deposits. 95 On the other hand, CBDC’s
ability to compete with, or even displace, commercial bank deposits sets
the stage for potentially more radical changes in the mechanisms of
monetary policy transmission—and the structure and operation of the
financial system, more broadly.
To date, virtually all CBDC discussions proceed on an
assumption that CBDC will be issued and administered alongside the
existing forms of commercial bank money. 96 Banks are generally
presumed to continue offering deposits, combined with other financial
services, even when CBDC goes live. In fact, this baseline assumption
is precisely what generates the complex set of CBDC design choices
discussed above. The expected parallel circulation of bank money and
central bank money creates the need to establish the terms on which
they coexist: mutual convertibility, potential limits on the availability
91. See generally id.
92. Id. at 13–23.
93. See id. at 25–33; Paul Wong & Jesse Leigh Maniff, Comparing Means of Payment: What
Role for a Central Bank Digital Currency?, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RSRV. SYS. (Aug. 13,
2020),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/notes/feds-notes/comparing-means-of-paymentwhat-role-for-a-central-bank-digital-currency-20200813.htm [https://perma.cc/AM7L-MH62].
94. Of course, digitization is not a novel feature of modern money. See infra note 317 and
accompanying text. Today’s commercial bank deposits are privately issued digital money, and
central bank reserve balances are sovereign digital currency. See Agustín Carstens, Gen. Manager,
Bank for Int’l Settlements, Lecture at Princeton University: The Future of Money and the Payment
System (Dec. 5, 2019), https://www.bis.org/speeches/sp191205.pdf [https://perma.cc/EVT9-RPMY].
95. See Jack Meaning, Ben Dyson, James Barker & Emily Clayton, Broadening Narrow
Money: Monetary Policy with a Central Bank Digital Currency (Bank of Eng., Staff Working Paper
No.
724,
2018),
https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/workingpaper/2018/broadening-narrow-money-monetary-policy-with-a-central-bank-digital-currency.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ER5P-TW5L].
96. See Raphael Auer, Giulio Cornelli & Jon Frost, Rise of the Central Bank Digital
Currencies: Drivers, Approaches and Technologies (Bank for Int’l Settlements, Working Paper No.
880, 2020), https://www.bis.org/publ/work880.pdf [https://perma.cc/KP59-39CQ].
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or amount of CBDC, the relative structure of interest rates, and so
forth. 97 Much of this “engineering” aims to make CBDC a less attractive
alternative to private deposits, in order to avoid so-called
“disintermediation” and lower the likelihood of more frequent and
violent bank depositor runs—an inherently difficult balancing act. 98
These attempts to minimize the inevitable structural disruption from
introducing a universally available CBDC, in effect, significantly
complicate the task of designing CBDC and slow down
its implementation.
By early 2020, a number of central banks around the world had
begun studying and preparing for potential pilot tests of their own
CBDC projects. 99 Yet, according to an industry survey, very few of them
had concrete near-term plans to issue their own CBDC. 100 The COVID19 pandemic, which forced economic transactions into virtual space and
dramatically reduced the use of physical cash, 101 catalyzed these
efforts. 102 Thus, Sweden’s Riksbank announced its e-krona test in
February of 2020. 103 Not long thereafter, the Chinese government
97. It is also what drives the emergence of complex theoretical accounts of, and attempts to
taxonomize, multiple forms of digital money with overlapping characteristics and intricate
interrelationships. See Morten Bech & Rodney Garratt, Central Bank Cryptocurrencies, BIS Q.
REV., Sept. 2017, at 55, 55, https://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt1709f.pdf [https://perma.cc/5QHJ49ZJ] (“[P]rovid[ing] a taxonomy of money that identifies two types of CBCC . . . .”); Tobias Adrian
& Tommaso Mancini-Griffoli, The Rise of Digital Money, INT’L MONETARY FUND: FINTECH NOTES
(July 15, 2019), https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/fintech-notes/Issues/2019/07/12/The-Rise-ofDigital-Money-47097 [https://perma.cc/5QKP-BJ8C].
98. See Niepelt, supra note 83 (discussing whether CBDC would “foster disintermediation
and bank runs”).
99. Auer et al., supra note 96, at 4.
100. Rachael King, The Central Bank Digital Currency Survey 2020—Debunking Some Myths,
CENT. BANKING (May 7, 2020), https://www.centralbanking.com/fintech/cbdc/7540951/the-centralbank-digital-currency-survey-2020-debunking-some-myths
[https://perma.cc/W4QC-JUCP].
Fewer than half of surveyed central banks were considering offering CBDC accounts directly to
the public. Rachael King, Central Banks Shift Focus to Retail CBDCs, CENT. BANKING (May 11,
2020), https://www.centralbanking.com/fintech/cbdc/7542766/central-banks-shift-focus-to-retailcbdcs [https://perma.cc/F543-H69C].
101. See, e.g., Ellen Caswell, Miranda Hewkin Smith, David Learmonth & Gareth Pearce,
Cash in the Time of COVID, BANK OF ENG. Q. BULL. (Nov. 24, 2020),
https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/quarterly-bulletin/2020/2020-q4/cash-in-the-time-of-covid
[https://perma.cc/9PWP-HDGY] (noting that declines in consumption and concerns over virus
transmission have reduced the use of cash for transactional purposes).
102. See Saloni Sardana, The ECB Is Looking ‘Very Seriously’ at the Creation of a Digital Euro,
INSIDER
(Oct.
12,
2020),
President
Christine
Lagarde
Says,
BUS.
https://markets.businessinsider.com/news/stocks/ecb-euro-digital-currency-lagarde-2020-101029670309# [https://perma.cc/JC95-KYST]; BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, ANNUAL ECONOMIC
REPORT 67 (June 2020), https://www.bis.org/publ/arpdf/ar2020e3.htm [https://perma.cc/X8HB8KN2].
103. Press Release, Sveriges Riksbank, The Riksbank to Test Technical Solution for the Ekrona (Feb. 20, 2020), https://www.riksbank.se/en-gb/press-and-published/notices-and-pressreleases/notices/2020/the-riksbank-to-test-technical-solution-for-the-e-krona/
[https://perma.cc/ZM87-L3VH].
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began pilot runs of its official digital yuan, widely seen as the potential
challenger to the U.S. dollar in international trade. 104
The Federal Reserve remained noticeably cautious in its CBDC
efforts, despite the shifting political context. 105 The U.S. government’s
inept pandemic response has exposed the intimate connection between
the CBDC idea and the practical need for publicly provided and
universally available deposit services. Federal financial aid, meant to
help individuals and households to weather the COVID-19 crisis, was
unacceptably slow to reach the most vulnerable segments of the
population without access to regular banking services. 106 Millions of
Americans, especially in poor and minority-populated communities,
had to wait for a month or more to receive paper checks from the federal
government. 107 This “logistical” problem brought into sharp relief both
the inexcusable lack of a fast retail payments system and the
unacceptably high human cost of being “unbanked” in the
United States. 108
104. Andy Mukherjee, Opinion, China’s Crypto Is All About Tracing—and Power, BNN
BLOOMBERG (May 23, 2020), https://www.bnnbloomberg.ca/china-s-crypto-is-all-about-tracingand-power-1.1440331 [https://perma.cc/Q73V-BYPG]; China Plans to Test Digital Yuan on Food
(July
14,
2020),
Delivery
Giant’s
Platforms,
BLOOMBERG
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-07-15/china-to-expand-digital-yuan-test-to-fooddelivery-giant-meituan?sref=gflekrOm [https://perma.cc/495Q-RJ6A].
105. See Lael Brainard, Governor, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., Speech at the
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco’s Innovation Office Hours: An Update on Digital
Currencies
(Aug.
13,
2020),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/brainard20200813a.htm
[https://perma.cc/9NBD-AWN7] (“Like other central banks, we are continuing to assess the
opportunities and challenges of, as well as the use cases for, a CBDC, as a complement to cash and
other payments options.”). In early 2021, the Fed’s leadership began signaling its intention to look
closely into digitizing the dollar, while nevertheless reiterating its commitment to proceeding
cautiously. Sarah Hansen, Fed Chair Powell Says Digital Dollar Is A ‘High Priority Project,’
FORBES (Feb. 23, 2021), https://www.forbes.com/sites/sarahhansen/2021/02/23/fed-chair-powellsays-digital-dollar-is-a-high-priority-project/?sh=4070e50a7e4c
[https://perma.cc/STY6-EHLF]
(“Powell said Tuesday that since the U.S. dollar serves as the world’s reserve currency, it’s more
important to get the project right than it is for the United States central bank to be first to unveil
a digital version of its currency.”); Michael S. Derby, Powell Says Congressional Support Likely
ST.
J.
(Mar.
22,
2021),
Needed
to
Adopt
Fully
Digital
Dollar,
WALL
https://www.wsj.com/articles/powell-says-congressional-support-likely-needed-to-adopt-fullydigital-dollar-11616424452 [https://perma.cc/2USR-XJAY] (quoting Powell as saying, “We don’t
need to rush this project, and we don’t need to be first to market”).
106. Amanda Fischer & Alix Gould-Werth, Broken Plumbing: How Systems for Delivering
Economic Relief in Response to the Coronavirus Recession Failed the U.S. Economy, WASH. CTR.
FOR EQUITABLE GROWTH (July 29, 2020), https://equitablegrowth.org/broken-plumbing-howsystems-for-delivering-economic-relief-in-response-to-the-coronavirus-recession-failed-the-u-seconomy/ [https://perma.cc/Y4KL-JXP5].
107. Caitlin Reilly, Delayed COVID-19 Aid Spurs Search for Faster Payments, ROLL CALL
(June 23, 2020), https://www.rollcall.com/2020/06/23/delayed-covid-19-aid-spurs-search-for-fasterpayments/ [https://perma.cc/3ZGP-T3Y3].
108. Id. It may be worth noting that, in August of 2019, the Fed announced its plan to build
an interbank real-time payments system, called FedNow, which is currently scheduled to launch
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Responding to this problem, in March of 2020, Senator Sherrod
Brown urgently introduced the “Banking for All Act,” which would
allow individuals to open free deposit accounts, or “digital dollar
wallets,” at the Federal Reserve. 109 Under the proposed bill, these
accounts would be available at regional Federal Reserve Banks and the
U.S. Postal Service (“USPS”) offices. Private banks would be obligated
to offer pass-through digital dollar wallets to individuals via separately
capitalized subsidiaries with assets consisting solely of reserve accounts
at the Fed. 110 In effect, Brown’s bill would recreate the classic
twentieth-century “narrow bank” model within the new CBDC
framework. 111
Of course, opening central banks’ balance sheets to nonbank
firms and households is not a new concept. In 1985, James Tobin
famously outlined the possibility of allowing “individuals to hold deposit
accounts in the central bank, or in branches of it established for the
purpose and perhaps located in post offices.” 112 In the wake of the global
financial crisis of 2008, European and U.S. economists began actively
debating proposals to expand access to central bank money, often in
tandem with CBDC proposals. 113 In 2018, the Swiss constitutional
in 2023. See FedNowSM Service, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RSRV. SYS.,
https://www.federalreserve.gov/paymentsystems/fednow_about.htm (last updated Apr. 28, 2021)
[https://perma.cc/UAZ5-5EY7] (“The FedNow Service will be available to depository institutions in
the United States and will enable individuals and businesses to send instant payments through
their depository institution accounts. The service is intended to be a flexible, neutral platform that
supports a broad variety of instant payments.”). Leaving aside the slow pace of the project, FedNow
is not intended to handle retail payments. Id. For more, see Peter Conti-Brown & David A.
Wishnick, Private Markets, Public Options, and the Payment System, 37 YALE J. ON REGUL. 380
(2020).
109. Banking for All Act, S. 3571, 116th Cong. (2020).
110. Id.
111. The “narrow bank” model traces its origins to Irving Fisher’s famous “100% reserve
banking” idea. See Irving Fisher, 100% Money and the Public Debt, ECON. F., Spring No., Apr.–
June 1936, at 406. In subsequent years, the idea was associated primarily with the Chicago school
of economics, before gaining renewed popular appeal in the wake of the 2008 crisis. See, e.g.,
LAURENCE KOTLIKOFF, JIMMY STEWART IS DEAD: ENDING THE WORLD’S ONGOING FINANCIAL
PLAGUE WITH LIMITED PURPOSE BANKING (2010); John H. Cochrane, Toward a Run-Free Financial
System, HOOVER INST. (2014); Adam J. Levitin, Safe Banking: Finance and Democracy, 83 U. CHI.
L. REV. 357 (2016); Jaromir Benes & Michael Kumhof, The Chicago Plan Revisited (Int’l Monetary
Fund,
Working
Paper
No.
12/202,
Aug.
2012),
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2012/wp12202.pdf [https://perma.cc/866K-7WGR].
112. James Tobin, Financial Innovation and Deregulation in Perspective, 3 BANK JAPAN
MONETARY & ECON. STUD. 19, 25 (1985).
113. For a small sample, see Dirk Niepelt, Reserves for All? Central Bank Digital Currency,
Deposits, and Their (Non)-Equivalence (CESifo, Working Paper No. 7176, July 2018),
https://www.cesifo.org/DocDL/cesifo1_wp7176.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8LH9-J5U3];
David
Andolfatto, Fedcoin: On the Desirability of a Government Cryptocurrency, MACROMANIA (Feb. 3,
2015),
http://andolfatto.blogspot.com/2015/02/fedcoin-on-desirability-of-government.html
[https://perma.cc/6CCL-KM9A]; Robert Sams, Which Fedcoin?, CRYPTONOMICS (Feb. 5, 2015),
https://cryptonomics.org/2015/02/05/which-fedcoin/ [https://perma.cc/6ZT9-U9VB]; and JP Koning,
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referendum on “Vollgeld” (sovereign money) underscored the growing
political appeal of such proposals. 114
In U.S. legal scholarship, both elements of Tobin’s original
idea—giving individuals access to central bank accounts and making
them available through USPS offices—provided important conceptual
framing for the post-2008 push to broaden financial inclusion. 115 The
best-known recent proposal to institute FedAccounts was advanced in
2018 by Morgan Ricks, John Crawford, and Lev Menand. 116 Their
proposal envisions FedAccounts as a cheaper and more efficient
alternative to, rather than an effective replacement for, private deposit
accounts offered by commercial banks. As proposed, FedAccounts would
have transactional functionalities of private bank accounts (save for the
overdraft coverage) but pay higher interest on deposits and avoid
predatory charges. They would provide a “money-and-payments safety
net” for the unbanked or under-banked American households and
“crowd out unstable, privately issued deposit substitutes.” 117 Overall,
the authors make a thoughtful and convincing case that ending banks’
privileged access to the Fed’s balance sheet would have a wide range of
salutary effects.
Notably, Ricks et al. frame their proposal as a variation on the
public banking idea, rather than a straightforward CBDC plan. 118
Ultimately, however, these parallel conversations—one on CBDC and
another one on FedAccounts—run into the same conceptual problem. In
Fedcoin, MONEYNESS (Oct. 19, 2014), http://jpkoning.blogspot.com/2014/10/fedcoin.html
[https://perma.cc/TN2H-2UHA].
114. See Press Release, Vollgeld Initiative, Campaign for Monetary Reform – News from
Switzerland (June 10, 2018), https://www.vollgeld-initiative.ch/english/ [https://perma.cc/8KC5RW85]. The Vollgeld plan sought to eliminate money creation by private banks and to render all
money fully sovereign. Id. Just over a quarter of Swiss voters supported the plan. See Ralph Atkins,
Swiss Voters Reject ‘Sovereign Money’ Initiative, FIN. TIMES (June 10, 2018),
https://www.ft.com/content/686e0342-6c97-11e8-852d-d8b934ff5ffa
[https://perma.cc/Y5DBANBX].
115. For a recent iteration of the postal banking proposal, see Postal Banking Act, S. 4614,
116th Cong. (2020). See also BARADARAN, supra note 6, at 225 (“One obvious option for public
banking would be to reinvigorate postal banking and use the expansive network of post offices
across the country.”); OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. POSTAL SERV., THE ROAD AHEAD FOR POSTAL
FINANCIAL SERVICES (May 2015), https://www.uspsoig.gov/sites/default/files/document-libraryfiles/2015/rarc-wp-15-011_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/R9LS-FVX6].
116. Ricks et al., supra note 7.
117. Id. at 1–2. Importantly, however, their proposal does not address potential new forms of
arbitrage and private over-leveraging likely to arise under the new regime, where fully “safe”
FedAccounts coexist with private bank deposit accounts. Cf. infra Part V.
118. Ricks et al., supra note 7, at 7–8. In a more recent iteration of their proposal, the
FedAccounts idea is introduced as a superior form of CBDC that simply bypasses the “digital
currency” hype. See John Crawford, Lev Menand & Morgan Ricks, FedAccounts: Digital Dollars,
89 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 113 (2021). This new framing acknowledges the originally downplayed
conceptual link without appreciably altering the substance of their vision, which remains
“philosophically harmonious” with postal banking proposals. Id. at 158.

1256

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:5:1231

both cases, the crucial question is: What would, or should, happen on
the asset side of the central bank balance sheet, in order to
accommodate the proposed expansion of central bank liabilities?
This question comes into particularly sharp relief in a scenario
where CBDC (whether or not in the form of FedAccounts) fully replaces
commercial bank deposits. Part of the reason for that is the sheer
quantitative impact of this shift. As a recent Bank of England paper put
it, “In this scenario there may be a shortage of high-quality assets to
back an enlarged central bank balance sheet, and therefore the central
bank may have to broaden the range of assets purchased or
lent against.” 119
The core of the problem, however, is not merely the magnitude
of portfolio expansion—it’s the composition of the central bank’s newly
expanded portfolio. Deciding which specific assets to purchase is an
inherently political act: it makes immediately transparent the fact that,
behind the veil of technocratic neutrality, central banks’ investment
choices have immense distributional consequences. 120 Perhaps not
surprisingly, most CBDC proposals either leave the composition
question unanswered or reduce it to a simple quantitative recalibration
of the traditional central bank asset portfolio. The latter typically
involves increased central bank lending to private banks (to replace
their lost deposits) and open-market purchases of high-quality public
and private debt securities. 121
The effect of this framing is to show that measures involving
CBDC issuance or creation of FedAccounts need not have a significant
impact on the overall structure and operation of the financial system. 122
Tactical considerations aside, this approach reflects the same
underlying preference for incremental change that drives—and
complicates—the ongoing discussions of CBDC design. 123 From this
perspective, the existing proposals seem to be caught in a
fundamentally normative dilemma: they embrace the idea of radically
democratizing access to central bank money, while leaving the rest of
the finance franchise system structurally intact. This underlying
normative commitment, in turn, limits the scope of potential solutions
to the asset-side problem arising in connection with both CBDC and
119. BANK OF ENG., supra note 90, at 37–38.
120. See supra Part II.A.
121. These include government debt instruments and highly rated corporate bonds. See Ricks
et al., supra note 7.
122. This excludes the obvious change in banks’ funding sources as they shift from deposits to
central bank borrowing. That shift, however, merely makes explicit the already existing implicit
government backing of private banks’ liabilities. Without more, this shift is not a fundamental
structural change. See id.
123. See supra notes 90–100 and accompanying text.
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FedAccounts. As a result, the full structural implications and
transformative potential of their advocated liability-side change remain
unexplored and unappreciated.
Overcoming these limitations requires a deeper, deliberately
unified approach to democratizing the central bank balance sheet.
Today’s technology promises to revolutionize not just the structure of
the Fed’s liabilities but the entire relational dynamics between the Fed
and the American public. These new dynamics will allow for a
qualitatively
different—more
nuanced,
proactive,
and
multidimensional—mode of conducting monetary policy, with the
FedAccount interest rate being only one of many novel modulatory tools
at the Fed’s disposal.
Even more importantly, these new relational dynamics will
fundamentally alter the normative context in which the Fed makes its
investment decisions. In the post-COVID world, it is already impossible
to deny the Fed’s critical role in direct credit allocation. Dramatically
expanding the size and changing the structure of the Fed’s liabilities
will create a crucial opportunity to re-envision and redirect its creditallocation power in qualitatively new ways. To take full advantage of
this opportunity, we need to think about what that may involve—and
how the Fed’s unique ability to act as the nation’s ultimate portfolio
manager can be utilized to the maximum public benefit.
The remainder of the Article tackles these important questions.
III. REFORMING THE LIABILITY SIDE: PUBLIC ACCESS AND MONETARY
POLICY
Beginning with the liability side of the central bank balance
sheet, this Article contemplates the issuance of general-purpose CBDC
(the “digital dollar”) and concurrent migration of all transaction deposit
accounts from private banks to the Federal Reserve. Focusing on the
ultimate “end-state” whereby central bank accounts fully replace—
rather than uneasily coexist with—private bank deposits, the Article
explores the full range of new monetary policy options the proposed
structural shift would enable.
A. The Proposal: FedAccounts as a Tool of Monetary Policy
As discussed above, the current structure of the Federal
Reserve’s liabilities reflects the underlying hierarchical organization of
the modern “franchise finance.” Currently, only banking institutions
are allowed to hold non-defaultable central bank money in the form of
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special reserve accounts. 124 In today’s interconnected and technologydriven world, however, this hard-wired structural separation of central
banks from the vast majority of real economic actors is becoming
increasingly inefficient and hard to justify.
The single most effective solution to this problem is to reform
the composition of the Fed’s liabilities by replacing commercial bank
reserve accounts with universally available deposit accounts. 125 The
core idea here is simply to allow all U.S. citizens and lawful residents,
local governments, nonbanking firms, and nonbusiness entities to open
transactional accounts directly with the Federal Reserve, thus
bypassing private depository institutions. In this sense, it is a variation
on the familiar FedAccounts—or FedCoin, “digital dollar wallets,”
etc.—theme. 126
In principle, FedAccounts can be made available as an
alternative to bank deposit accounts, upon a person’s request. 127 As
explained below, however, the more effective option would be to
transition all deposits to the Fed. 128 Functionally, all FedAccounts will
be essentially identical. For purely administrative purposes, however,
it would be advisable to differentiate among “individual” and “entity”
accounts. For U.S. citizens, Individual FedAccounts would be opened
automatically upon birth or naturalization. These accounts would also
be credited automatically with regularly received federal benefits:
social security payments, tax refunds, and all other disbursements that
depend on one’s citizenship status. 129 For qualifying resident aliens,
Individual FedAccounts would be opened and closed upon request,
rather than automatically, but otherwise would function in the same
manner. 130 Entity FedAccounts could also be administratively divided
into separate categories, depending on whether the holder is a
government unit, a nonprofit organization, or a business entity
incorporated or operating in the United States.

124. See supra Part I.B.1.
125. See supra notes 109–118 and accompanying text.
126. See supra Part II.B.
127. As described above, the existing proposals to open the Fed’s balance sheet to nonbank
depositors often implicitly assume this optionality. See, e.g., Ricks et al., supra note 7. For a
discussion of potential systemic risks associated with it, see infra notes 149–153 and accompanying
text.
128. See infra notes 152–153 and accompanying text.
129. These disbursements also include any additional public benefits that may exist in the
future: periodic “dividends” from sovereign wealth funds, “baby bonds,” and so forth.
130. Establishing specific eligibility criteria for resident aliens’ access to FedAccounts would
require careful consideration of multiple factors, including racial and economic justice, national
security, immigration policy goals, and so on.
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This internal classification will simplify and optimize federal
payments—including economic stimulus benefits or crisis-time
financial aid—to all entitled recipients. The inherent programmability
of the digital dollar would enable the Fed to manage these, as well as
any other, payments in real time and with maximum flexibility,
capturing the necessary gradations in the amounts or timing of
individual transfers. 131
Just like today’s bank reserve accounts, all FedAccounts would
earn interest. 132 The interest rate on these accounts would serve as an
important tool of the Fed’s monetary policy, setting an effective floor in
the overall interest rate structure. As widely acknowledged, such a
direct rate-setting ability would dramatically increase the Fed’s efficacy
and flexibility in managing the economy-wide costs of borrowing. 133
Yet, dynamically adjusting the cost of money rentals via
manipulation of interest on FedAccounts is not the only—or even the
most powerful—new monetary policy tool that the proposed reforms
will put on the table. Far more importantly, offering deposit accounts
to individuals and entities will enable the Fed to modulate the
aggregate supply of money and credit by directly crediting and debiting
the accounts of all participants in economic activity, without
interposing intermediary-banks.
In basic terms, the Fed will credit all eligible FedAccounts when
it determines that it is necessary to expand the money supply in order
to stimulate economic activity and ensure better utilization of the
national economy’s productive capacity. In the economic literature, this
form of unconventional (by present standards) monetary policy is
commonly known as “helicopter drop” or “QE for the people.” 134 The
131. See Wong & Maniff, supra note 93 (discussing programmability of digital money).
132. See supra notes 46–48 and accompanying text.
133. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
134. For a small sample of academic and popular discussions of “helicopter money” and “QE
for the people” proposals, see Richard Baldwin, Helicopter Money: Views of Leading Economists,
VOXEU (Apr. 13, 2016), https://voxeu.org/article/helicopter-money-views-leading-economists
[https://perma.cc/S5FM-AC62]; Ben S. Bernanke, What Tools Does the Fed Have Left? Part 3:
Helicopter
Money,
BROOKINGS:
BEN
BERNANKE’S
BLOG
(Apr.
11,
2016),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/ben-bernanke/2016/04/11/what-tools-does-the-fed-have-left-part3-helicopter-money/ [https://perma.cc/9VCC-M935]; Willem H. Buiter, The Simple Analytics of
Helicopter Money: Why It Works – Always, ECONOMICS (June 13, 2014), http://www.economicsejournal.org/dataset/PDFs/discussionpapers_2014-24.pdf [https://perma.cc/4L6E-DP54]; Anatole
Kaletsky,
How
About
Quantitative
Easing
for
the
People?,
REUTERS,
https://web.archive.org/web/20200225014828/http:/blogs.reuters.com/anatolekaletsky/2012/08/01/how-about-quantitative-easing-for-the-people/ (last updated Aug. 2, 2012)
[https://perma.cc/84Dk-33F5]; and Martin Wolf, The Case for Helicopter Money, FIN. TIMES (Feb.
12,
2013),
https://www.ft.com/content/9bcf0eea-6f98-11e2-b906-00144feab49a
[https://perma.cc/U776-5HRC]. The “helicopter” colloquialism originates with Milton Friedman,
The Role of Monetary Policy, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 1 (1968). Some thirty years earlier, Keynes used
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obvious benefit of this tool is that it solves the problem of a central bank
“pushing on a string” in a “liquidity trap” situation. 135 The principal
criticism of this approach, on the other hand, is that it fundamentally
alters central banks’ functions and puts them in charge of
“redistribution decisions that are fiscal in nature.” 136 In contrast to
conventional monetary expansion through crediting banks’ reserve
accounts in exchange for bonds or other assets, helicopter drops do not
symmetrically increase the asset side of the central bank’s balance
sheet. 137 Another sense in which helicopter drops are considered
dangerously asymmetrical is that, once new money is credited to
people’s accounts, it creates a permanent expectation of never having to
part with it. It is, therefore, seen as disabling monetary policy as a tool
of fighting inflationary pressures. 138
These familiar criticisms notwithstanding, the “helicopter”
mode of monetary policy can be both feasible and desirable if carefully
designed and thoughtfully implemented. While many specific details of
this regime’s practical operation are bound to take shape in the
implementation phase, a few basic design choices are worth
outlining here.
Thus, with respect to monetary expansion management, it
would be necessary to set the criteria for (1) deciding which accounts
will be eligible to receive automatic credits, and (2) determining the
absolute and/or relative amounts of such credits to various types
of accounts.
On the eligibility issue, one option is to make every deposit
account held at the Fed eligible for credit. For practical reasons,
however, it might make sense to restrict unconditional, or automatic,
helicopter drop measures only to (1) Individual FedAccounts of U.S.
citizens, and (2) Entity FedAccounts of local governments and
governmental units. Other FedAccounts may be included in the
program subject to certain conditions. For example, private business
entities may have to commit to spending the credited funds on “real”
goods and services rather than speculative financial-asset purchases.
the metaphor of burying money in bottles. See JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF
EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST AND MONEY (1936).
135. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
136. Kevin Dowd, Against Helicopter Money, 38 CATO J. 147, 162 (2018).
137. See, e.g., Lucrezia Reichlin, Adair Turner & Michael Woodford, Helicopter Money as a
Policy Option, VOXEU (Sept. 23, 2019), https://voxeu.org/article/helicopter-money-policy-option
[https://perma.cc/65E7-PNTR] (discussing the pros and cons of “helicopter money”).
138. See id. For a fascinating account of the use of “helicopter money” during the famine and
plague in seventeenth-century Venice, see Charles Goodhart, Donato Masciandaro & Stefano
Ugolini, Pandemic Recession, Helicopter Money and Central Banking: Venice, 1630 (Ctr. for Econ.
Pol’y Rsch., Discussion Paper No. DP15715, 2021).
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Employee retention and continuing provision of work benefits could be
another important condition in this respect. Individuals, on the other
hand, may qualify if they are permanent or long-term U.S. residents or
if they demonstrate special need of funds. 139
On the amount issue, there is again a range of potential choices.
One option is to credit the same amount to each eligible account. This
would be the easiest to execute from a purely logistical viewpoint. To
maximize the economic stimulus of the helicopter drops, however, it
may make more sense to have a progressive scale for crediting accounts
of individuals, so that less wealthy U.S. citizens and eligible residents
receive proportionately higher amounts of money. This differentiation
would channel more funds to the people who both need it most and will
be more likely to spend the money on daily purchases.
It would also make sense to credit Entity FedAccounts on a
higher scale, to reflect the fact that firms and other entities typically
run significantly larger balance sheets than most individuals do.
Generally, however, such decisions should depend on the specific
problems that particular uses of this option aim to resolve. Thus, a
“helicopter drop” in response to serious but temporary distress in
specific industrial sectors might call for targeted crediting of a
particular set of accounts, one in response to a pandemic or a regional
disaster might target a different set, and so forth.
Implementing a contractionary monetary policy by debiting
FedAccounts, in turn, presents a different set of ex ante institutional
choices aiming to minimize the economic and political fallout from what
is likely to be perceived as the government “taking away” people’s
money. 140 This tool is to be reserved only for extreme and rare
circumstances, when the Fed is unable to control inflation by raising
interest rates and deploying its new asset-side tools, discussed below. 141
It is nevertheless important to have a mechanism in place for draining
excess liquidity from these accounts with minimal disruption of
productive activity.
One potential approach could be to set up each account as a twotiered structure, in a manner functionally similar to the familiar
combination of a checking and a savings account. The first tier—a
“transaction sub-account”—would be used for making and receiving
payments, including regular governmental disbursements like tax
refunds, social security benefits, and so forth. The second tier—a
139. This is merely a broad-stroke sketch of potential approaches to these inevitably complex
choices.
140. See supra notes 137–138 and accompanying text.
141. See infra Part IV.
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“reserve sub-account”—would be explicitly reserved for use as the
destination account for the receipt, transfer, and holding of funds
designated by the Fed as subject to a specific monetary policy action.
If and when the Fed injects monetary base into the system, each
reserve sub-account would be credited with the appropriate
“helicoptered” amount. If and when the Fed seeks to drain money from
the system, the appropriate amount would be transferred from the
transaction sub-account to the same holder’s reserve sub-account,
where it would be effectively escrowed until the Fed ends its tightening
policies. These temporarily “reserved” funds would pay a higher
interest than the regular interest paid by the Fed on money held in
transaction sub-accounts. Importantly, raising this reserve interest
rate would enable the Fed to incentivize depositors to move more of
their money from transaction into reserve sub-accounts voluntarily.
Strategic use of this tool, therefore, may decrease the need for
the mandatory “reserving” of people’s money, which would also help to
counteract negative perceptions of this policy. 142 In effect, the
tightening of the money supply would be achieved through a
compulsory but economically attractive investment scheme. 143
In periods when the Fed is not actively pursuing antiinflationary monetary policies, account holders would be free to draw
down on their reserve sub-accounts, which would pay the same rate of
interest as the associated transaction sub-accounts. During such
periods, the key would be to reduce potentially negative effects of the
public’s uncertainty about the Fed’s future monetary policy decisions.
Thus, to avoid or minimize unnecessarily harsh liquidity shocks,
especially for small businesses and vulnerable individuals, it would be
important for the Fed to communicate its intentions clearly and
continuously, with as much advance warning as possible. 144 It would
also make sense to exempt from mandatory debiting by the Fed
accounts of (1) individuals with incomes or assets below a certain level,
142. To a great extent, these negative perceptions reflect Americans’ notoriously generalized
and ideologically driven mistrust of the government. Thoughtfully designing and implementing a
coherent money-modulation strategy would reshape the context in which people would think about
the Fed’s credits and debits of their accounts.
143. In economic terms, it would be similar to investing in the high-interest U.S. Treasury
bond. Curiously, Keynes advocated functionally similar measures as part of his plan to prepare
Britain for a long war with Nazi Germany. See JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, HOW TO PAY FOR THE WAR
(1940).
144. More broadly, opening the Fed’s balance sheet to the general public would require a
fundamental change in the Fed’s current mode of communicating its monetary policy decisions and
goals. Among other things, the Fed’s communication process will need to be more seamlessly
continuous, clear, and accessible than it is today. For a general discussion of the importance of the
Fed’s communication for monetary policy, see Peter Conti-Brown, Yair Listokin & Nicholas R.
Parrillo, Toward an Administrative Law of Central Banking, 38 YALE J. ON REGUL. 1, 38–41 (2021).
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(2) local governments and their agencies, and (3) certain qualifying
small businesses. 145
Undoubtedly, there are numerous additional details that will
need to be worked out before this system is put in place. 146 The purpose
of this discussion is to outline in principle how the proposed
restructuring of the Fed’s liabilities would enable it to conduct both
expansionary and contractionary monetary policy in a far more direct
and effective manner than it is able to do today. Of course, this
restructuring would also have a wide range of other implications, both
for the Fed’s own balance sheet and for the financial system more
generally. These implications are discussed in greater detail below. 147
The remainder of this Part focuses on the more immediate institutional
design issues arising in connection with the creation of FedAccounts.
B. Transforming the Core of the Franchise: Institutional Design Issues
The proposed reform of the Fed’s liabilities raises numerous
questions, most of which are best left for the implementation phase. It
is nevertheless helpful to highlight a few key design choices that go
directly to the core of the proposed change in the current finance
franchise arrangement. 148
From this perspective, the most important set of choices
concerns the role of private financial firms, including banks, in the
newly redesigned and digitized money-and-payments system. As
discussed above, most existing CBDC proposals assume that private
banks will continue to offer deposit accounts, either exclusively or

145. An exemption for local governmental units is sensible and necessary because of their
ongoing obligations to provide critical public services and social assistance to disadvantaged
communities. Exemptions for small businesses, however, should be restricted only to cases in
which the mandatory debiting of their accounts would cause undue hardship to their employees or
communities.
146. This includes establishing specific procedures for making the necessary decisions in a fair
and transparent manner and in full compliance with the applicable legal and administrative
requirements.
147. See infra Parts IV–V.
148. This Article deliberately leaves out a number of design issues that are either sufficiently
covered in the existing literature or not critical in advancing the Article’s core claims. It is easy to
stipulate, for example, that (1) the money in FedAccounts would be freely convertible into physical
cash (which is important for privacy and inclusion reasons); (2) cash would be easily accessible
through ATMs or at physical service locations (potentially including USPS branches); (3)
FedAccounts would not be subject to any fees (but would not allow overdrafts); and (4) real-time
payments would be available around the clock. The existing literature covers these and related
issues in sufficient detail. See supra Part II.B. For similar reasons, the Article does not trace the
mechanics of payments flows in the FedAccounts system, nor does it get into detailed discussions
of distributed ledger technology (“DLT”) that can be used to run it.
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alongside the central bank. 149 These choices are typically justified—
explicitly or, more often, implicitly—by appeal to pragmatic
considerations. Keeping private bank deposits would minimize
potential structural disruption to the existing system, thus reducing
political opposition and easing the transition to the new CBDC regime.
Continuing to outsource at least some deposit-taking to private banks
would also reduce the public cost and administrative burden on the
central bank. Private actors are often said to be better positioned to
undertake the consumer-facing activity associated with CBDC, which
includes a wide variety of things ranging from customer service to
compliance with “Know Your Customer” (“KYC”) and anti–money
laundering rules. 150 Finally, dealing with private banks may
assuage depositors’ concerns about potential state surveillance of
their accounts. 151
At the same time, allowing private banks to continue accepting
deposits in competition with the central bank potentially creates
significant problems from the perspective of systemic stability.
Universal availability of fully sovereign digital money will make it
much easier for all bank depositors to “run to safety” in real time, thus
taking the classic bank run problem to the next level. Furthermore,
private banks—particularly, large ones nestled inside diversified
financial conglomerates—will have strong incentives to offer depositors
not only higher interest rates on their accounts but also a broader suite
of high-risk, high-return financial products. 152 While it is difficult to
predict what specific forms this risk arbitrage might take, past
experience shows that their appearance is virtually certain. 153 In effect,
149. See supra Part II.A. Notably, Ricks et al. also envision the continuing availability of bank
deposit accounts alongside FedAccounts. Supra note 7.
2021),
150. BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, ANNUAL REPORT 27–29 (June
https://www.bis.org/about/areport/areport2021.pdf [https://perma.cc/W9VF-XM85] (suggesting
that private actors are best equipped to perform operational tasks associated with “customerfacing activit[ies]”).
151. See Sarah Allen et al., Design Choices for Central Bank Digital Currency 45 (Brookings,
Working
Paper
No.
140,
July
2020),
https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2020/07/Design-Choices-for-CBDC_Final-for-web.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6R7MTKXD] (“In cultures where banking customers are more inclined to trust private companies than
governments with their personal information, this form of role separation for privacy may be
reasonable and useful, however limited.”); Macro Musings, The Future of Digital Fiat Currency,
MERCATUS CTR. (Feb. 11, 2019), https://www.mercatus.org/bridge/podcasts/02112019/futuredigital-fiat-currency [https://perma.cc/YT2H-J2M5] (David Beckworth and Rohan Grey discussing
digital currency and privacy issues).
152. This is a particularly salient possibility with respect to banks’ institutional clients,
though it is difficult to rule out the possibility of riskier products being marketed, perhaps
indirectly, to retail depositors as well.
153. In fact, the present ubiquity of bank demand deposits is a product of successful arbitrage
by state-chartered banks in response to the creation of the U.S. national bank charter in 1863–
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introducing FedAccounts as merely an option on top of the current
“finance franchise” arrangement may greatly exacerbate the
fundamental dysfunctions built into it.
This Article, accordingly, advocates full migration of demand
deposits onto the Fed’s balance sheet. Importantly, however, some
private financial institutions may still be able to assist the Fed with
administering FedAccounts, if doing so is deemed to be in the
public interest.
For example, community banks and small credit unions could be
licensed to offer “pass-through FedAccounts” on the same terms as, and
directly backed by, deposits at the Federal Reserve. 154 These licensed
“community banking institutions” (“CBIs”) would operate physical
branches and ATMs on the Fed’s behalf and receive a fee for their
services. 155 In addition, they would be able to offer basic noncheckable
savings accounts and certificates of deposit, paying interest at rates
exceeding the FedAccount rates. 156 To generate extra income, CBIs may
also be allowed to provide their customers with affordable investment
advice and basic financial and account management services.
Ultimately, however, CBIs would be integrated in the Fed’s new
payments system for reasons of public policy, as crucially important
local providers of essential banking services to middle-class and
especially low-income and currently under-banked communities across
the United States. 157 Their branches would effectively function as the
1864. See History of the Federal Reserve, FED. RSRV. EDUC.ORG (last visited Sept. 12, 2021),
https://www.federalreserveeducation.org/about-the-fed/history [https://perma.cc/F5QP-JMCC].
154. This parallels the approach proposed in Senator Brown’s bill. Each depositor of a licensed
community banking institution would be entitled to the proportional amount held by the
institution in its “master FedAccount,” on the 100 percent reserve basis. Only entities below a
specified asset-size threshold would be eligible for the license. See supra notes 109–111 and
accompanying text.
155. Various state and local “public banks” may also qualify for the CBI license. For more on
the “public bank” idea, see Esra Nur Ugurlu & Gerald Epstein, The Public Banking Movement in
the United States: Networks, Agenda, Initiatives, and Challenges 1 (Pol. Econ. Rsch. Inst., Working
BANKING
INST.,
Paper
No.
538,
2021);
and
Research/Legislation,
PUB.
https://www.publicbankinginstitute.org/research-legislation/ (last visited June 13, 2021)
[https://perma.cc/X8DQ-N38K].
156. Broader access to simple and safe savings products is a critical element of financial
inclusion. To ensure that CBIs serve the needs of low- and middle-income retail customers, it would
be desirable to establish amount limits on these savings products (no “jumbo CDs”). CBIs would
be allowed to invest funds deposited in these non-transactional accounts in a wider range of “safe”
assets, including Treasury and agency securities, tax-exempt municipal bonds, and certain other
highly liquid financial instruments (including bonds issued by the National Investment
Authority). See infra Part IV.A.2.
157. To maximize these public benefits, CBIs would also be able to engage in community
lending activities. Funding for CBI loans, however, would not come from any deposits these
institutions manage or issue. Instead, CBIs would be eligible to borrow from the Fed by accessing
its New Discount Window facility, proposed infra Part IV.A.1.
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Fed’s representative offices, thus giving CBIs’ “franchisee” status a very
direct meaning. 158 These new franchisee-institutions would not engage
in money creation. Instead, they would utilize their unique
understanding of local economic conditions and community needs to
help the Fed with the day-to-day administration of FedAccounts.
Outside of this particular context, the extent of private
firms’ participation in the provision of payments and related
transactional services becomes a matter of technological, as much as
institutional, design.
As a general matter, moving all demand deposits onto the
central bank’s balance sheet renders many complex technological
choices currently associated with CBDC design fundamentally
superfluous. 159 This “direct CBDC” option enables the Fed to internalize
all payments by simultaneously crediting and debiting transacting
parties’ accounts on its own digital ledger—just like it currently does
with respect to interbank payments. 160
Within this streamlined architecture, it may nevertheless be
desirable to allow private “payment service providers” (“PSPs”) to
perform certain “front-end” customer-facing functions, such as KYC
checks and user-friendly mobile applications for initiating or receiving
payments. 161 By providing valuable overlay services—financial recordkeeping, personalized account management, and so forth—these
specially licensed PSPs can enhance FedAccount user experience,
without imposing additional costs on the Fed. 162
At the same time, however, introducing this new institutional
layer could create new risks for depositors and complicate the Fed’s
158. This means that keeping CBIs in business, especially in low-income and underserved
communities, may require public subsidy (reflected in service fees). To the extent these
institutions’ size and permissible activities are subject to explicit legal limitations, this particular
form of subsidy should not be problematic. Accordingly, CBIs will be subject to macroprudential
regulation and supervision, appropriately modified for their business and risk profiles.
159. See supra notes 90–98 and accompanying text.
160. For diagrams illustrating the basic mechanics of payments flows under different CBDC
arrangements, including what they call the “direct CBDC” model advocated in this Article, see
Raphael Auer & Rainer Böhme, The Technology of Retail Central Bank Digital Currency, BANK
FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS Q. REV., Mar. 2020, at 85, 89.
161. See BANK OF ENG., supra note 90, at 25–33. The COVID experience makes it particularly
important to enable FedAccount holders to use mobile apps for accessing and managing their
finances. See John C. Pitts, Survey Finds That Fintech Has Been a Lifeline During COVID-19,
PLAID:
BLOG
(Sept.
15,
2020),
https://blog.plaid.com/2020-fintech-effect-covid/
[https://perma.cc/NX94-FQR2].
162. In fact, the Fed could receive fee revenues from PSPs allowed to connect to its ledger. To
access the Fed’s ledger via an Application Programming Interface (API), PSPs would have to meet
security, resiliency, and other requirements. The Fed could either license PSPs itself or rely on the
licensing scheme administered by another federal agency, such as the Federal Trade Commission
(“FTC”) or the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”).
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ability to use its new tools of monetary policy, discussed above. 163
Accordingly, it is critical that PSPs are required to maintain a
FedAccount for each user, so that all payments among their users are
processed and recorded directly on the Fed’s ledger. 164 This approach
would preclude PSPs from engaging in unauthorized deposit-taking
activities and protect the overall integrity of the FedAccounts system.
As long as the deposit relationships remain with the Fed, adding a layer
of private service delivery contracts would not expose depositors to the
risk of any individual PSP’s insolvency. 165 Without the need for
prudential oversight, PSPs would be regulated only under the relevant
consumer protection scheme. 166
Of course, the present discussion purposely brackets a number
of potentially important technical-design issues. Thus, it assumes that
the Fed would have the necessary technological capacity to manage
FedAccounts, without having to outsource a substantial part of its
operations to private firms. It also leaves aside issues related to
ensuring reasonable levels of transactional privacy for FedAccount
holders. In part, depositors’ privacy concerns should be alleviated by (1)
the continuing availability of physical cash, and (2) the CBI option for
deposit services. 167 A more complete solution, though, would likely
require technology enabling sufficiently anonymous digital-dollar
payments, subject to amount limitations and other conditions necessary
to prevent criminal transactions. 168 These technological solutions may
involve outsourcing of certain functions to private firms: CBIs, PSPs, or
perhaps a separate category of licensed providers. 169 Any such
institutional arrangements would have to be narrowly delineated and
closely monitored by the Fed.
To sum up, the proposed restructuring of the Fed’s liabilities
would fundamentally alter the dynamics at the very core of the finance

163. See supra Part III.A.
164. BANK OF ENG., supra note 90, at 27. Alternatively, each PSP could be allowed to maintain
a “pooled” FedAccount, holding all its users’ money, and to process payments among its users
internally. That, however, would fragment the payment system and impede the Fed’s ability to
deploy “helicopter money” tools. See Baldwin, supra note 134.
165. See Dan Awrey, Bad Money, 106 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2020) (discussing financial risks
associated with potential insolvencies of peer-to-peer payment platforms).
166. Individual PSPs may be regulated by the FTC or the CFPB (if they provide consumer
financial services), with the focus on fraud prevention, disclosure, data security and privacy, nondiscrimination, and other relevant aspects of the PSP-client relationship. See supra note 162 and
accompanying text.
167. Depositors worried about potential government surveillance of their payments may prefer
opening accounts at CBIs.
168. See Macro Musings, supra note 151.
169. Id.; Allen et al., supra note 151, at 44–45.
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franchise system. 170 As shown in this Part, it would dramatically
expand—and qualitatively change—the Fed’s present arsenal of
monetary policy tools. The FedAccounts system would empower the Fed
to determine, in a direct and efficiently tailored way, both the structure
of interest rates and the overall quantity of money flowing in the
economy. The inherent programmability of digital money would make
this process even more flexible and responsive to the economy’s needs.
In effect, the Fed would be able to conduct monetary policy by managing
the liability side of its own ledger.
That, however, immediately raises an important question: What
needs to happen on the asset side of the Fed’s balance sheet in order to
accommodate this shift? Answering this question is the key to
understanding the full extent of the potential system-wide
transformation that begins with opening the Fed’s balance sheet to
ordinary Americans.
IV. REFORMING THE ASSET SIDE: PUBLIC-PRIVATE CAPITAL
ALLOCATION
The creation of FedAccounts will have profound structural
implications for the Fed’s balance sheet—and, more broadly, its role in
the economy. By definition, the most visible such implication is the
dramatic expansion in the size of the Fed’s liabilities, which requires
the corresponding growth of its assets. This Part examines the
qualitative impact of this structural shift on the Fed’s asset portfolio. It
envisions a fundamental change in the asset composition of the Fed’s
balance sheet, which would unlock its potential to function as the
ultimate public platform for creating and managing system-wide
financial flows, or the People’s Ledger.
A. The Proposal: New Discount Window, Public Infrastructure
Finance, and Systemic Stabilization Portfolio
As discussed above, any deliberate expansion of central banks’
balance sheets tends to invite intense political controversy. 171 The
CBDC debate provides a good example of this underlying discomfort
with the idea of a central bank running “too big” a book as a result of

170. Given the pace of technological change, however, it is critical that the Fed remain vigilant
in policing against new forms of unauthorized private amplification or replication of the sovereign’s
money-creation function. These may include, for example, sophisticated new leveraging strategies
and complex digital assets, directly or indirectly linked to FedAccounts.
171. See supra Part I.B.
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issuing its own digital currency. 172 The principal—and most frequently
voiced—concern here is that digitizing central bank money will render
central banks dangerously powerful and vulnerable to political
manipulation and abuse. A subtler version of the same sentiment
focuses on central banks having to hold and manage assets offsetting
their digital money issuances. In wider discussions, the idea of central
banks as large-scale investors in financial assets triggers familiar
warnings about governments “crowding out” private investment or
“picking winners and losers” in ostensibly private markets. 173 Experts
channel the same worry by emphasizing the difficulty of defining
technical parameters for central banks’ expanded portfolios and the
riskiness of “a potentially larger central bank footprint” in the
financial system. 174
In short, the problem appears to stem from the recognition that
CBDC issuance opens the possibility of dramatically increasing the role
of public allocation of capital. Most objections to allowing significant
quantitative growth of central bank balance sheets, in fact, reflect the
underlying concerns about the qualitative, compositional aspects of
such growth. Ultimately, however, these concerns are rarely
substantiated by reference to anything more specific than deeply
internalized skepticism toward the government as an economic actor. 175
By contrast, this Article views the proposed change in the Fed’s
liabilities as an opportunity to augment both (1) its ability to modulate
credit-money supply more effectively, and (2) its potential to facilitate
the more efficient allocation of that supply to productive enterprise.
As discussed above, the Fed’s traditional asset portfolio includes
primarily Treasury and agency debt and various securities purchased
pursuant to its crisis-containment and market-stabilization
operations. 176 Under the present proposal, the Fed’s principal asset
holdings will fall into one of three key categories: (1) redesigned
discount window loans to qualifying lenders, (2) securities issued by the
existing and newly created public instrumentalities for purposes of
financing large-scale public infrastructure projects, or (3) an
172. See supra Part II.B.
173. See, e.g., Stephen G. Cecchetti & Kermit L. Schoenholtz, The Fed Goes to War: Part 3,
MONEY
&
BANKING
(Apr.
12,
2020),
https://www.moneyandbanking.com/commentary/2020/4/12/the-fed-goes-to-war-part-3
[https://perma.cc/4H7V-B3R5] (“[P]icking winners and losers is not a sustainable assignment for
independent technocrats. It is a role for fiscal authorities, not central bankers.”).
174. BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, supra note 102, at 87.
175. For analysis refuting such skepticism, see Robert C. Hockett & Saule T. Omarova, Public
Actors in Private Markets: Toward a Developmental Finance State, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 103 (2015)
[hereinafter Public Actors].
176. See supra Part I.B.
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expanded portfolio of trading assets maintained for purposes of
dynamic market stabilization. 177
Each of these three new asset categories represents both a
significant departure from and a direct extension of the Fed’s current
investment strategy. In this sense, the proposed restructuring of the
Fed’s asset portfolio builds on what the central bank is doing already in
pursuit of macroeconomic stability goals, but in a more direct and
effective manner.
1. “New Discount Window” Loans
The first category of assets on the Fed’s newly reconstituted
balance sheet would be what this Article calls the “New Discount
Window” (“NDW”) loans. Currently, discount window loans do not
occupy a significant place on the Fed’s balance sheet. Only depository
institutions, such as commercial banks, are currently eligible for
discount-window borrowing. 178 Banks, however, are generally reluctant
to borrow from the Fed because of the commonly described “stigma”
attached to discount window loans as a sign of the borrowing banks’
diminished ability to access liquidity in the interbank-loan market. 179
Massive migration of deposits directly onto the Fed’s balance
sheet, proposed above, will potentially necessitate a significant shift in
the scale and core function of the discount window. Most immediately,
it will force commercial banks to seek alternative sources of funding in
order to continue their lending activities. The extreme difficulty of
replacing deposit liabilities with comparably priced and “sticky” nondeposit funding on a comparable scale will likely cause massive
contraction in bank lending. 180
To keep the economy-wide flow of credit, the most readily
available option would be to open the Fed’s discount window to banks
and other former depository institutions that (1) continue to engage in
lending activity, and (2) meet specified qualification criteria (described
177. In addition to these three new asset classes, the Fed will be able to continue holding U.S.
Treasury bonds and other government securities, as well as other assets it routinely acquires in
the course of its operations (SDRs, gold certificates, foreign currencies, etc.). See supra note 55 and
accompanying text. For purposes of presentational clarity and brevity, the following discussion
focuses only on the three newly proposed asset classes.
178. See supra notes 55–58 and accompanying text.
179. This does not prevent banks from borrowing through the Fed’s discount window when
market conditions demand it. See Renee Courtois Haltom, Federal Reserve: Stigma and the
Discount Window, 15 ECON. FOCUS 6 (2011); Yalman Onaran, U.S. Banking Giants Tap Fed’s
Discount
Window
to
Ease
Stigma,
BLOOMBERG
(Mar.
16,
2020),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-03-17/u-s-banking-giants-tap-fed-s-discountwindow-to-ease-stigma [https://perma.cc/99P5-7F4k].
180. See supra notes 119–121 and accompanying text.
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below). These “qualifying lending institutions” (“QLIs”) will be able to
borrow from the Fed at preferential rates and against qualifying highquality collateral. In contrast to the current model of discount window
as a short-term backup liquidity facility for troubled banks, the NDW
will function as the principal channel for directing funds deposited in
FedAccounts into private credit markets. The NDW credit facility will
efficiently and effectively replace deposit funding for banks and enable
a broad range of nonbank credit institutions to access this reliably
“patient,” stable, and affordably priced capital. 181
From the Fed’s—or the public’s—perspective, this expansion of
direct liquidity provision constitutes a logical continuation of the
current practice of outsourcing loan portfolio management to private
financial institutions. 182 By directly supporting private lenders’ credit
allocation activities, the Fed will be able to harness private market
actors’ micro-informational advantages and microeconomic incentives
in the public interest.
Of course, it will be critically important to protect the Fed’s
balance sheet by imposing strict eligibility requirements on private
lenders’ access to its NDW facility. These should include both collateral
eligibility criteria and entity qualification requirements.
The criteria for acceptable NDW collateral need not differ
significantly from the current requirements: the assets pledged by the
QLIs will have to be of sufficiently high quality, much like they would
be under today’s discount window regime. 183 At the same time, the
NDW facility’s role as the principal source of publicly subsidized
funding for private credit markets will greatly amplify the impact
of the Fed’s collateral eligibility policies on the economy-wide
credit allocation.
To maximize the allocative impact of the NDW facility, the Fed
could supplement its traditional credit-quality criteria for NDW-eligible
collateral by explicitly preferencing certain categories of assets (such
as, for example, loans to small and medium-size non-financial
enterprises and minority-owned businesses, student loans, credit
supporting development in underserved communities, bonds issued by
181. State and local “public banks” and similar institutions will also be eligible to access the
NDW facility. Given their public mission and depending on their individual business models and
needs, they will operate under a modified QLI regime. See supra note 155.
182. Such outsourcing is the defining feature of the existing “franchise” finance. See supra
Part I.A. This point is also emphasized in Crawford et al., supra note 118; and Rohan Grey,
Banking in a Digital Fiat Currency Regime, in REGULATING BLOCKCHAIN 169 (Phillip Hacker,
Ioannis Lioanos, Georgios Dimitropoulos & Stefan Eich eds., 2019).
183. See Federal Reserve Collateral Guidelines, FED. RSRV. SYS. 3 (Sept. 2020),
https://www.frbdiscountwindow.org/RightNavPages/Pledging-Collateral.aspx
[https://perma.cc/6EQ9-BVGJ].
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firms in certain sectors of the economy, etc.) and excluding others (such
as, for example, margin loans, private equity bridge loans, highly
engineered asset-backed securities, etc.). While building on the current
discount window practice, these new standards would allow for a more
granular pursuit of a broader policy agenda. Furthermore, the Fed
could make carefully targeted adjustments to its collateral eligibility
criteria, for the specific purpose of temporarily increasing (or,
conversely, decreasing) the amount of private credit flowing into
particular segments of the economy. This type of dynamic adjustment
would make the most sense when the Fed detects specific structural
bottlenecks or other inefficiencies in the allocation of credit across
various sectors or types of producers. 184
Another tool of maximizing the flow of publicly subsidized
private credit to productive enterprise, as opposed to socially
suboptimal speculative activities, is to impose specific activity
limitations and other prudential requirements on private lenders
eligible to access the NDW facility. Again, this approach to entity
eligibility is a direct continuation of the existing regime, under which
only regulated depository institutions that are subject to activity
restrictions and extensive prudential supervision have access to the
Fed’s discount window. However, as discussed below, a more targeted
imposition of investment and affiliation limitations on QLIs eligible for
the NDW borrowing can serve as a potentially powerful lever of
structural reform in the financial services sector. 185
2. The National Investment Authority Issuances
The second important asset category on the Fed’s restructured
balance sheet would comprise a broad range of public issuances in
addition to the standard holdings of Treasury and agency debt. The
proposed restructuring of the Fed’s balance sheet would enable it to
channel a significant portion of funds corresponding to the newly
created FedAccounts into large-scale purchases of securities issued by
various public instrumentalities for purposes of financing of critical
public infrastructure projects.

184. It is important to ensure that the Fed uses this dynamic adjustment of collateral
eligibility criteria in a carefully calibrated manner, only for as long as it is necessary to correct the
targeted allocative inefficiency, and clearly communicates its intentions to QLIs. The key is to
retain policy flexibility without creating market uncertainty.
185. For a more detailed discussion, see infra Part V.A.
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One such public instrumentality is the National Investment
Authority (“NIA”), proposed elsewhere. 186 Filling the critical
institutional gap between the Fed and the Treasury, the NIA would be
tasked with devising and implementing a comprehensive national
development strategy. 187 In essence, it is envisioned as the modern-day
equivalent of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (“RFC”), the New
Deal–era public institution that successfully led a massive nationwide
capital mobilization campaign to aid Depression-struck sectors of the
American economy. 188 Much like the RFC, the NIA would transact
directly in private financial markets, proactively channeling public and
private financial resources into large-scale, transformative public
infrastructure projects. 189 Importantly, however, it would reverse the
familiar pattern of “public capital, private management” typical of most
modern “public-private partnerships” in favor of the “public
management, mixed public-and-private capital” model. 190
Under the proposed scheme, one arm of the NIA would pursue a
wide range of well-established credit-mobilization strategies:
originating, guaranteeing, and maintaining secondary markets for
loans to public and private parties that undertake publicly beneficial
infrastructure projects. In this role, the NIA would be acting as an
infrastructure-specific analogue to the RFC and its surviving offspring,
the home finance GSEs. 191
Another arm of the NIA would function as a hybrid of a sovereign
wealth fund (“SWF”) and a private equity firm. Following the business
model of a typical asset manager, the NIA would set up a series of
collective investment funds (structured similarly to traditional private
equity funds) and actively solicit private investors—pension funds,
insurance companies, university endowments, foreign SWFs, and so
186. For a detailed proposal, see Saule T. Omarova, Why We Need A National Investment
Authority
(Cornell
L.
Sch.
L.
Stud.,
Rsch.
Paper
No.
20-34,
2020),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=3566462 [https://perma.cc/3LTP-HQPX]; and National Investment
Authority, supra note 26, at 469–90.
187. See supra note 186.
188. For an overview of the RFC’s experience in nationwide credit allocation, see National
Investment Authority, supra note 26, at 458–63. For an expanded discussion of the proposed NIA’s
functions as a national crisis-response coordinator, see Omarova, supra note 186; and Saule T.
Omarova, Crises, Bailouts, and the Case for a National Investment Authority, JUST MONEY (Apr.
1, 2020), https://justmoney.org/s-omarova-crises-bailouts-and-the-case-for-a-national-investmentauthority/ [https://perma.cc/5XUM-JEFL].
189. See SAULE T. OMAROVA, DATA FOR PROGRESS, THE CLIMATE CASE FOR A NATIONAL
INVESTMENT AUTHORITY 1 (2020), https://www.filesforprogress.org/memos/white-paper-nia.pdf
[https://perma.cc/QX3J-3NPW] (discussing the creation and role of an NIA).
190. Id. at 5; Saule T. Omarova, Public Investment Reimagined: A National Investment
Authority, AM. PROSPECT (Dec. 1, 2020), https://prospect.org/economy/public-investmentreimagined-a-national-investment-authority/ [https://perma.cc/PU29-KYMA].
191. OMAROVA, supra note 189, at 7–9.
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on—to purchase passive equity stakes in its funds. The NIA’s dedicated
professional teams would then select and manage individual funds’
portfolios of public infrastructure assets: nationwide clean energy
networks and high-speed railroads, regional air and water cleaning and
preservation programs, systems of ongoing adult education and
technical training, networks of mixed public-private “startup” finance
funds, and so on. 192 The NIA would be able to employ advanced financial
engineering methods to reward private investors for their participation
in financing these large-scale, long-term economic growth-boosting
projects—even where such projects do not generate easily privately
“capturable” revenues. 193
It is important to emphasize that the NIA will partner up with
private investors not out of financial necessity but solely in order to (1)
offer a productive, non-speculative and non-inflationary outlet for
private investment capital; and (2) incorporate price signals into its own
investment decisions, thereby leveraging private markets’ informationproduction capacity as a tool of public decisionmaking. 194 In this sense,
the NIA proposal operationalizes the principle of public modulation and
allocation of money and credit.
A detailed discussion of the NIA’s institutional design and
operation is beyond the scope of this Article. For present purposes, the
key is to emphasize the crucial complementarity between the
establishment of a public infrastructure finance agency, on the one
hand, and the proposed redesign of the Fed’s balance sheet, on the
other. Instruments issued by the NIA represent a particularly wellsuited asset category for the Fed’s newly expanded portfolio. By
purchasing NIA issuances, the Fed would be investing in the long-term
development of the nation’s economic capacity. In effect, the Fed would
be offsetting the dramatic increase in its own liabilities—thus relieving
the pressure on its own balance sheet—by dramatically augmenting the
flow of credit into the coordinated nationwide construction of public
infrastructure that enables and facilitates structurally balanced,
socially inclusive, and sustainable economic growth. 195
Importantly, however, the Fed would not be making any direct
credit-allocation decisions on a project-by-project basis—a task
192. Id. at 9–10 (briefly outlining the general structure and functions of the NIA as an asset
manager).
193. For a discussion of the specific methods and techniques of financial and legal engineering
the NIA could adapt to this end, see id. at 10–12; and National Investment Authority, supra note
26, at 475–80, 486–90.
194. See OMAROVA, supra note 189, at 12.
195. For a discussion of the NIA’s ability to generate economic growth that is socially inclusive,
sectorally and geographically balanced, and sustainable in the long run, see National Investment
Authority, supra note 26, at 469–89; and Omarova, supra note 190.
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explicitly reserved for the NIA. 196 This should help to avoid or minimize
any potential accusations of the Fed exceeding its mandate and
conducting overtly fiscal policy. 197 From the Fed’s perspective,
purchasing NIA instruments will function as a much higher-level
portfolio strategy that, along with the more familiar NDW facility, aims
to support and manage the flow of public and private credit to
productive economic enterprise. In that sense, it will represent an
addition to, or expansion of, the Fed’s well-established practice of
purchasing Treasury and agency debt. 198
3. “OMO Plus” Assets
The third principal asset category on the Fed’s balance sheet will
consist of a diversified portfolio of financial instruments acquired
through the Fed’s expanded open market trading operations, or
“OMO Plus.” 199
As discussed above, the Fed currently makes extensive use of
the traditional OMO tool, regularly buying and selling Treasury and
agency debt and entering into repo and reverse repo transactions—all
for the explicit purpose of managing interest rates. 200 OMO Plus is a
relatively straightforward extension of this well-established monetary
policy tool. Under this proposal, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York
(“FRBNY”) would conduct regular purchases and sales of a broad range
of securities and other tradable financial assets with an explicit view to
modulating volatile swings in what has been defined elsewhere as
“systemically important prices.” 201
To this end, the FRBNY would establish a separate trading
portfolio replicating, as closely as practicable, the market portfolio. In
effect, this portfolio would be an index fund reflecting the proportional
values of all financial asset classes constituting the financial market as
a whole. 202 Once the fund is established, the Fed would conduct its
current daily tracking of the nation’s financial markets.
196. As mentioned above, the NIA would operate as a hybrid federal instrumentality, situated
between the Fed and the Treasury. See supra Part IV.A.2.
197. See, e.g., GEORGE SELGIN, THE MENACE OF FISCAL QE (2020) (arguing against central
bank asset purchases as a way of aiding fiscal policy). But cf. Bateman, supra note 63 (detailing
the role of central banks in providing direct financial support for fiscal authorities).
198. See supra Part I.B.
199. Public Actors, supra note 175, at 140–44 (detailing the OMO Plus proposal).
200. See supra Part I.B.2.
201. For a detailed account of “systemically important prices,” see Robert C. Hockett & Saule
T. Omarova, Systemically Significant Prices, 2 J. FIN. REGUL. 2 (2015).
202. In constructing this portfolio, it might be easier to start by including only publicly traded
securities. This prototype market portfolio could be a broad stock index, such as S&P 500 or
Wilshire 5000. However, because this approach might leave systemically important asset classes
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If a particular asset class—such as mortgage-backed securities
or technology stocks—rises in market value at rates suggestive of a
bubble trend, the FRBNY trading desk will short these securities,
thereby putting downward pressure on their prices. This type of action
would tend to tighten the flow of speculative credit to the asset class in
question, because (1) speculative profit prospects would be diminished
by the price drop; and (2) the Fed’s engineering the drop would signal
to the market its determination that current prices of the asset in
question are artificially inflated and accordingly best suppressed.
Conversely, the FRBNY will go long on particular asset classes that
appear to be artificially undervalued in order to avoid unnecessary
market dislocation. It will follow the same process in targeting broader
market-price fluctuations. 203
OMO Plus would thus serve as a flexible and direct tool of
preventing systemically destabilizing booms and busts in financial
markets. Importantly, it will not operate as simply another form of QE
or a similar market-backup mechanism. 204 The Fed will not be
announcing its intention to stand ready to purchase a particular class
of financial assets from particular financial institutions in order to prop
up a particular market segment experiencing distress. Its OMO Plus
trading will function as a far more nimble, granular, and continuous
response to certain market movements potentially signaling concerning
trends. The resulting portfolio of tradable financial assets on the Fed’s
balance sheet—its new market-stabilization portfolio—would be set off
against its newly expanded deposit liabilities.
The figures below illustrate the combined changes on both the
asset and liability sides of the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet,
proposed above. Figure 1 presents, in a highly stylized and abbreviated
form, the basic structure of the Fed’s balance sheet under the current
system. Figure 2, by contrast, depicts the principal elements comprising
the newly reimagined Fed balance sheet.

out of the program’s reach, it is preferable to replicate the entire market portfolio as closely as
possible. See Public Actors, supra note 175, at 141.
203. Id. at 142.
204. Post-2008, the Fed’s role as a market maker is often discussed as a necessary crisiscontainment measure. See MEHRLING, supra note 65; HAL S. SCOTT, CONNECTEDNESS AND
CONTAGION: PROTECTING THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM FROM PANICS 1 (2016). This Article, by contrast,
contemplates proactive use of the central bank’s market-making capacity as an important tool of
crisis prevention.
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FIGURE 1: FED BALANCE SHEET AS THE “FRANCHISOR LEDGER”
Assets

Liabilities

- U.S. Treasury securities

- Currency (notes)

- Agency & GSE securities

- Reserve accounts

- Discount Window loans

- Other liabilities

- Other Assets

FIGURE 2: FED BALANCE SHEET AS THE “PEOPLE’S LEDGER”
Assets

Liabilities

- New Discount Window loans

- Currency

- NIA issuances

Physical notes

- OMO Plus trading assets

Digital cash/tokens

- Other Assets

- Deposits (“FedAccounts”)
Individual
Entity
- Other liabilities

B. The Fed’s Balance Sheet as the “People’s Ledger”
Redesigning the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet, as envisioned
in this Article, would fundamentally transform and democratize both
the financial system and the broader economy. The asset-side reforms
proposed in this Part, in particular, would consciously embrace and
harness the power of the central bank to allocate credit to productive
economic enterprise.
As the preceding discussion makes clear, this deliberate
overhaul of the Fed’s asset portfolio requires a significant change in the
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broader institutional context in which the central bank operates. At
bottom, the standard objections to, and concerns about, the Fed actively
using its balance sheet to shape credit allocation erroneously assume
structural immutability of the presently existing financial system.
Once we accept the fact that the structural context for the Fed’s
asset allocation itself can and should be changed, allowing the Fed to
manage a much larger asset portfolio should not appear as a dangerous
deviation from the norm. In fact, under the scheme proposed here, the
Fed’s operations will finally render the orthodox notion of “financial
intermediation” a reality. 205 By providing universally accessible deposit
accounts and channeling the corresponding amounts into select classes
of private and public issuances, the Fed will effectively stand as the
intermediating link between savers/investors (the liability side) and
wealth/productivity growth (the asset side).
In this sense, the proposed restructuring of the Fed’s balance
sheet would signify a critical shift in the existing finance franchise
arrangement. Currently, as discussed above, the Fed’s balance sheet
reflects its role as the sovereign franchisor whose principal liabilities
run to, and whose assets are acquired from or through, private
franchisee-institutions. 206 These private institutions occupy the
privileged position of mediating the central bank’s participation in, and
engagement with, the nation’s financial and economic system. Under
the proposal advanced here, there will be no need for granting these
private financial institutions exclusive access to the Fed’s balance sheet
and control over creation and allocation of sovereign credit-money—a
fundamentally public function. 207 The Fed’s balance sheet will function
as the ultimate platform for the integrated public management of the
economy-wide flows of the sovereign public’s full faith and credit. It will
become the People’s Ledger.
From this perspective, the increased size of the Fed’s balance
sheet is a measure of the People’s Ledger’s depth and capaciousness. A
bigger, deliberately constructed, and dynamically managed asset
portfolio is an indicator of the Fed’s enhanced ability to channel
our collectively accumulated financial resources into productive
economic activities.
Importantly, private financial institutions will still engage in
credit allocation on a more granular, micro level. Thus, the Fed’s NDW
facility will enable QLIs to extend private loans to entities and
205. For a critique of the “intermediation” narrative of finance, see Finance Franchise, supra
note 12, at 1148.
206. See supra Part I.B.
207. See Finance Franchise, supra note 12.
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individuals. 208 These private lenders will be assisting the central bank
by utilizing their Hayekian micro-informational advantages and
transactional expertise to evaluate and select individual investment
opportunities. 209 Similarly, the proposed NIA would directly partner
with private institutional investors for purposes of financing public
infrastructure projects. To the extent these investors are free to choose
alternative uses for their capital, this model would provide the NIA with
a valuable mechanism for receiving market feedback. 210 In this sense,
the People’s Ledger is a tool of optimizing the overall public-private
balance of power in our fundamentally hybrid financial system.
Of course, the proposed shift in the Fed’s business model raises
a host of administrative and other implementation-related issues that
would require careful consideration at appropriate times. For present
purposes, the key threshold question is whether, and how, the proposed
restructuring of the Fed’s balance sheet would affect its overall
mandate and operation. 211
Under the current law, the Federal Reserve’s charge is to
“[m]aintain long run growth of the monetary and credit aggregates
commensurate with the economy’s long run potential to increase
production, so as to promote effectively the goals of maximum
employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates.” 212
This statutory language is sufficiently broad to accommodate the shifts
in its asset portfolio, described above. In fact, the proposed shifts would
empower the Federal Reserve to fulfill this broad legal mandate far
more effectively than it has done so far.
For decades, the Fed’s monetary policy mandate has been
interpreted narrowly as pursuing the “dual” goal of price stability with
maximum employment, via interest rate manipulation—a notoriously
blunt tool. 213 This uneasy “duality” of the mandate and the Fed’s limited
success in balancing its imperatives in practice have long been a source

208. See supra Part IV.A.1.
209. See supra Part IV.A.1.
210. See supra Part IV.A.2.
211. This article does not address the Fed’s legal authority to offer FedAccounts to individuals
and non-financial firms on the understanding that Section 16 of the Federal Reserve Act will need
to be amended to enable this activity. See 12 U.S.C. § 411.
212. 12 U.S.C. § 225a. This formulation was adopted in 1977 and is widely known as the Fed’s
“dual mandate.” See Aaron Steelman, The Federal Reserve’s “Dual Mandate”: The Evolution of an
Idea, FED. RSRV. BANK OF RICHMOND (Dec. 2011), https://www.richmondfed.org//media/richmondfedorg/publications/research/economic_brief/2011/pdf/eb_11-12.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MY6Z-PN8N].
213. See Steelman, supra note 212; see also, e.g., CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL30354, MONETARY
POLICY AND THE FEDERAL RESERVE: CURRENT POLICY AND CONDITIONS 1, 7, 20 (2020).
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of intense debate and controversy. 214 By utilizing the full array of new
tools on both sides of its balance sheet, the Fed would be able to perform
its statutory mission in an integrated manner, without being caught in
an artificial trade-off between promoting employment-generating
growth on the one hand, and ensuring price stability on the other. 215 In
important ways, the perceived conflict between these two policy
objectives is a product of the current system that bifurcates the
functionally unified process of modulation and allocation of sovereign
credit-money. 216 Giving the Fed a more direct and clearly defined
allocative role would help to bridge this gap and serve as a
crucial enhancement of the Fed’s ability to perform its traditional
modulatory function.
OMO Plus, for instance, is a direct tool of preventing harmful
inflation of financial asset prices. 217 Similarly, the NDW program is a
straightforward mechanism of maintaining elastic money supply. The
enhanced ability to condition access to the NDW facility on private
lenders’ willingness to channel financing into certain sectors of the U.S.
economy, however, gives the Fed a new lever of credit allocation. 218 To
the extent this involves more granular and explicit qualitative choices
with respect to directing credit flows than what is typically done under
the current discount window arrangements, it may require technical
adjustments or updates to the Fed’s collection and use of
macroeconomic and financial data. Thus, to manage the supply and cost
of privately available credit effectively, the Fed would need to monitor
relevant market dynamics and analyze relevant quantitative and
qualitative data with a specific view to (1) identifying potential
structural impediments to achieving desired levels of output,
productivity, employment, or other policy-driven metrics in specific
214. Since 1977, the Federal Reserve has been repeatedly criticized for favoring its pricestability goal over the maximum-employment objective. See, e.g., Steelman, supra note 212, at 3.
In the post-2008 era, some Fed officials have directly questioned the general feasibility of having
a central bank pursue any policy goals other than inflation control. FED. RSRV. BANK OF ST. LOUIS,
The Fed’s Dual Mandate: Lessons of the 1970s, in MANY MOVING PARTS: A LOOK INSIDE THE U.S.
LABOR MARKET, ANNUAL REPORT (Apr. 2011), https://www.stlouisfed.org/annual-report/2010
[https://perma.cc/8FEG-NJEW] (a message from bank President and CEO James Bullard); Al
Stamborski, A Look at the Fed’s Dual Mandate, FED. RSRV. BANK OF ST. LOUIS: OPEN VAULT BLOG
(Aug. 8, 2018), https://www.stlouisfed.org/open-vault/2018/august/federal-reserve-dual-mandate
[https://perma.cc/NQB2-6SX3]. Others have advocated targeting economic growth measures, such
as nominal GDP, instead of the inflation rate. See, e.g., Matthew O’Brien, A Rebellion at The
(May
2,
2012),
Federal
Reserve?,
ATLANTIC
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/05/a-rebellion-at-the-federal-reserve/256601/
[https://perma.cc/2TZ4-EDJD].
215. See supra note 214.
216. See supra Part I.B.
217. See supra notes 201–204 and accompanying text.
218. See supra notes 183–184 and accompanying text.
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pockets of the economy; and (2) correcting these imbalances in an
optimally targeted and timely manner, among other things, by
incentivizing QLIs to increase or decrease lending to specific
borrower categories. 219
It is important to emphasize that updating or repurposing the
Fed’s existing analytical apparatus to support its new range of action
does not automatically render the Fed an agent of fiscal or industrial
policy. While proactively managing the economy-wide flow of credit, the
Fed would not be making any direct investment decisions, especially at
the level of individual projects or entities. 220 Public investment
decisions would be left to the Treasury and the newly created NIA.
Having the NIA, in particular, take on the task of mobilizing public and
private investment in the real economy would significantly ease the
currently mounting political pressure on the Fed to use its balance
sheet to create jobs, fight climate change, reduce racial and social
inequity, and so forth. 221 The NIA’s broad developmental policy
mandate would explicitly embrace these critical public policy goals. 222
In this context, the creation of the NIA would allow the Fed to provide
tangible support for these policies, while also fulfilling its own legal
mandate more effectively.
One final point deserves a brief mention here. Explicitly
embracing the Fed’s role in credit allocation, as proposed above, would
require closer coordination and information-sharing among the Fed, the
Treasury, and the NIA. While the Fed would continue to rely primarily
on its formidable in-house expertise in tracking and analyzing
macroeconomic data, soliciting direct input from the Treasury and the
NIA would augment its capacity to assess and prioritize specific
structural imbalances potentially demanding NDW policy responses. In
this tangible way, abandoning the illusory notion of technocratic
neutrality as the basis of sound monetary policy creates an important
opening for a more deliberate and transparent incorporation of

219. See supra Part IV.A.1.
220. See supra notes 196–198 and accompanying text. Importantly, the Fed would retain its
emergency lending powers under Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act. See 12 U.S.C. § 343;
Menand, supra note 74. Under the proposed new regime, however, these powers “of last resort”
will likely be reserved for truly exceptional circumstances.
221. See Patrick Honohan, A Monetary Policy Tilt for Climate and Inequality?, PETERSON INST.
FOR INT’L ECON.: REALTIME ECON. ISSUES WATCH
(Oct. 17, 2019, 9:30 AM),
https://www.piie.com/blogs/realtime-economic-issues-watch/monetary-policy-tilt-inequality-andclimate-change [https://perma.cc/E7AZ-JLJF]; Victoria Guida, An Activist Central Bank? Dems
Push the Fed to Fight Racial Inequality, POLITICO (Aug. 29, 2020, 7:00 AM),
https://www.politico.com/news/2020/08/29/federal-reserve-race-economic-activism-404560
[https://perma.cc/V9JP-669P].
222. See supra Part IV.A.2.

1282

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:5:1231

democratically established public policy priorities into the
Fed’s operations. 223
To sum up, the proposed structural changes to the Federal
Reserve’s asset portfolio, along with the broader institutional reforms
necessary to enable these changes, would fundamentally redefine the
public-private balance of power in the finance franchise. Under the new
arrangement, the sovereign public will manage system-wide flows of
credit by performing both the familiar modulatory and the newly
expanded allocative functions in an integrated—and therefore more
effective—fashion.
It is difficult to overestimate the profound systemic implications
of this comprehensive transformation of the Fed’s balance sheet from
the traditional “franchisor ledger” into the People’s Ledger. While it is
impossible to offer a fully detailed account of how this reform will
reverberate throughout the entire financial system, it is helpful to trace
some of its principal structural consequences.
V. THE PEOPLE’S LEDGER IN ACTION: STRUCTURAL IMPLICATIONS
The creation of universally available FedAccounts and
corresponding reconfiguration of the Fed’s asset portfolio, proposed
above, are bound to generate significant changes in the key functions,
business models, and risk profiles of many private financial institutions
and markets. Broadly retracing the logic of the existing finance
franchise, this Part offers a high-level—and inevitably somewhat
speculative—overview of these potential changes, starting with
commercial banks and then moving through the multiple layers of
money and capital markets. 224 Without claiming to offer a complete map
of the new system, it shows how transforming the Fed’s balance sheet
into a true People’s Ledger would reduce socially harmful speculative
trading in financial instruments, make the financial system less
complex and more efficient, and enable financial markets to perform
their core function of supporting productive economic enterprise
more effectively. 225
223. This could potentially raise questions about the Fed’s political independence, which are
beyond the Article’s scope. For present purposes, it is worth emphasizing that, in our democratic
society, institutional independence is an inherently complex and context-dependent phenomenon.
For in-depth analyses of this phenomenon, see PETER CONTI-BROWN, THE POWER AND
INDEPENDENCE OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE (2016); and PAUL TUCKER, UNELECTED POWER: THE
QUEST FOR LEGITIMACY IN CENTRAL BANKING AND THE REGULATORY STATE (2018).
224. For the original exercise tracing the operation of the existing system of franchise finance,
see Finance Franchise, supra note 12.
225. As a brief side note, it is worth mentioning here that a comprehensive shift to the People’s
Ledger model of central banking would also impact the structure and operation of the market for
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A. Potential Impact on the Banking Sector
Every proposal to institute universally available Fed deposit
accounts immediately invites the question of how it would affect
commercial banks. Under the currently standard model of banking
business, banks are expected to operate by (1) extending long-term
loans they hold on their balance sheet until maturity, and (2) funding
these illiquid long-term credit assets by taking demand deposits. 226 A
wholesale migration of deposits out of commercial banks would,
therefore, directly impinge on banks’ traditional funding model—and
threaten their continuing ability to extend credit to businesses
and individuals.
In practice, of course, banks’ balance sheets do not strictly
conform to this presumed model of the “banking business.” Today’s
banks do not hold all loans to maturity, choosing instead to securitize
or sell them in secondary markets. Nor do they fund their assets
exclusively with deposits. This is especially true of large and mid-size
banks operating within the diversified “financial holding company”
(“FHC”) structures. 227 Under the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956
Treasury debt. Among other things, it would remove the principal rationale for the continuing
reliance on primary dealers: large banks and securities firms licensed to buy Treasury securities
at auctions for purposes of reselling them to other market participants. See Primary Dealers, FED.
RSRV. BANK OF N.Y., https://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/primarydealers (last visited June 15,
2021) [https://perma.cc/WLY5-8QWC]. Primary dealers make markets in Treasury debt and act as
the trading counterparties of the FRBNY in implementation of monetary policy. Id.; KENNETH D.
GARBADE, FED. RSRV. BANK OF N.Y., STAFF REP. NO. 777, THE EARLY YEARS OF THE PRIMARY
DEALER
SYSTEM,
(June
2016),
https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/staff_reports/sr777.pdf?la=en
[https://perma.cc/8WS2-VW85] (describing primary dealers’ function as the historically created
“interface” between the Fed and the market). The fundamental revamp of the Fed’s monetary
policy tools, proposed in this Article, would render primary dealers functionally superfluous. See
supra Part III. Instead, advanced technological solutions could be used to open Treasury bond
auctions to mutual funds, pension funds, insurance companies, and other institutional investors
that currently buy these bonds in secondary markets for their long-term investment portfolios.
The Fed could accordingly act as the direct market maker for Treasury securities—the function it
already performs, albeit indirectly and often non-transparently. See Bateman, supra note 63
(examining the mechanisms through which the Fed and other central banks have been effectively
monetizing significant amounts of government debt since the 2008 crisis); Will Bateman,
Quantitative Easing, Quasi-Fiscal Power and Constitutionalism, JUST MONEY (Dec. 28, 2020),
https://justmoney.org/will-bateman-quantitative-easing-quasi-fiscal-power-andconstitutionalism/ [https://perma.cc/T7WH-8SRP]. Such a significant shift in the organization and
functioning of the Treasury market would have potentially far-reaching fiscal policy implications
and raise a host of complex political, legal, and operational issues. A discussion of these issues and
implications, however, is beyond the scope of this Article.
226. As discussed above, this is merely a description of the standard narrative that fails to
capture the entirety of these dynamics. See supra Part I.A.
227. See 12 U.S.C § 1843(k). Under the law, “bank holding companies” (“BHCs”) that own or
control U.S. banks are subject to strict activity limitations. FHCs are a subset of BHCs, which
satisfy certain financial and management criteria and therefore can engage in financial (and some
commercial) activities ordinarily not available to BHCs. See infra note 231 (citing sources).
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(the “BHC Act”), 228 as amended by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of
1999, 229 FHCs are allowed to engage in a broad range of financial
activities, including securities underwriting and dealing, investment
fund management, insurance, and so forth. 230 Large, diversified FHCs
actively use their deposit-taking bank subsidiaries’ balance sheets to
support their lucrative trading, dealing, and investing activities they
conduct through their nonbank subsidiaries. 231 To the extent deposits,
especially FDIC-insured retail deposits, are by far the cheapest and
“stickiest” form of bank funding, they remain a critical driver of banking
institutions’ profitability. 232 Accordingly, the proposed restructuring of
the Fed’s balance sheet will have potentially significant impact not only
on deposit-taking banks but also on their parent companies and
nonbank affiliates.
To begin with, it is critical to emphasize that the creation of
FedAccounts does not really have to affect the asset sides of banks’ own
balance sheets. As discussed above, the proposed NDW mechanism will
enable banks to continue their lending activities by accessing low-cost
Fed funding instead of deposits. 233 Importantly, this change in the
identity of private banks’ main creditor—from the multitude of
dispersed depositors to the Fed—would eliminate the underlying causes
of bank “runs.” 234 Thus, replacing demand deposits with Fed discount
window loans will remove the key source of fragility built into banks’
traditional business model.
228. Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-511, §§ 1–12, 70 Stat. 134 (1956)
(codified as amended at 12 USC §§ 1842–1848).
229. Financial Services Modernization Act (Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act), Pub. L. No. 106-102,
113 Stat. 1338 (1999). The Act repealed Sections 20 and 32 of the Banking Act of 1933, popularly
known as the Glass-Steagall Act, which established legal separation between commercial banks
and investment banks. See supra note 36.
230. See 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(1)(A) (“[FHCs] may engage in any activity [that is] financial in
nature or incidental to such financial activity.”).
231. For detailed discussions of FHCs’ activities and intragroup risk-transfer practices, see
Saule T. Omarova, The Merchants of Wall Street: Banking, Commerce, and Commodities, 98 MINN.
L. REV. 265, 342–46 (2013); Saule T. Omarova, From Gramm-Leach-Bliley to Dodd-Frank: The
Unfulfilled Promise of Section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1683, 1696–1702
(2011) [hereinafter The Unfulfilled Promise].
232. See, e.g., ADAM J. LEVITIN & SUSAN M. WACHTER, THE GREAT AMERICAN HOUSING
BUBBLE: WHAT WENT WRONG AND HOW WE CAN PROTECT OURSELVES IN THE FUTURE 163–80
(2020) (discussing banks’ use of “sticky” insured deposits to finance risky securitizations).
233. See supra Part IV.A.1 (showing how the NDW facility will channel funds into private
credit markets).
234. This point is emphasized in Crawford et al., supra note 118, at 133–35. Generally, bank
runs are situations in which individual depositors simultaneously rush to withdraw their money
from the bank they fear to be on the brink of insolvency. For an influential economic model of a
bank run, see Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and
Liquidity, 91 J. POL. ECON. 401, 405–10 (1983). Once the money is fully sovereign, there is no
danger of default.
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In essence, banks will become non-depository lenders. They
would use NDW financing for loans and other eligible assets that meet
the Fed’s NDW criteria for credit quality. 235 They would finance loans
not eligible for NDW funding—“non-qualifying” loans—by issuing
corporate debt and equity securities in capital markets, much in the
same way as other corporations do. 236 As discussed below, they would
also be able to fund these non-qualifying loans via private-market
securitizations. 237 Without the federal subsidy attached to demand
deposits, banks’ riskier investments and activities—as well as those
deemed less critical from the public policy perspective—will be directly
subject to market discipline.
Banks, in other words, will not be “special” anymore. 238 By
separating their lending function from their monetary function, the
proposed reform will effectively “end banking,” as we know it. 239 Credit
generation, fundamentally dependent upon the monetized full faith and
credit of the sovereign public, will be reserved either for public
instrumentalities or for QLIs—private lenders with access to the Fed’s
NDW facility.
Once banks lose their “special” status and entity-based access to
the public subsidy, they will inevitably lose their appeal as potential
acquisition targets for other financial institutions. Tying the subsidy to
specific NDW-qualifying assets generated by private firms, rather than
to the firms themselves, makes it far more difficult (if not impossible)
to transfer the benefits of that subsidy to these firms’ affiliates. 240 The
ability to transfer such benefits from federally backed banks to
affiliated securities firms, derivatives dealers, and asset managers is
the source of so-called “implicit” public subsidy that FHCs currently

235. For a discussion of the NDW collateral criteria, see supra Part IV.A.1.
236. This bifurcation of private lenders’ assets would be similar to the well-established
practice in the U.S. home-finance markets, where the GSEs are restricted by law to purchasing
only so-called “conforming” loans. Conforming Loan Limits, FED. HOUS. FIN. AGENCY,
https://www.fhfa.gov/DataTools/Downloads/Pages/Conforming-Loan-Limits.aspx (last visited
June 18, 2021) [https://perma.cc/QP95-5GXM].
237. See infra Part V.B.4 (arguing that this proposal would force banks to “re-focus on primary
markets for capital”).
238. See E. GERALD CORRIGAN, FED. RSRV. BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS, ANNUAL REPORT 1982: ARE
BANKS SPECIAL? 7 (1983).
239. The phrase is a direct play on the title of JONATHAN MCMILLAN, THE END OF BANKING:
MONEY, CREDIT, AND THE DIGITAL REVOLUTION (2014).
240. Technically, sections 23A and 23B of the Federal Reserve Act impose a set of quantitative
and qualitative limitations on deposit-taking banks’ extensions of credit to their nonbank
affiliates. 12 U.S.C. §§ 371c to c-1. In practice, however, this regime has not been sufficiently robust
to prevent the transfer of the subsidy within bank-centered financial conglomerates. For a detailed
analysis of this regime and its shortcomings, see The Unfulfilled Promise, supra note 231, at 1696–
1702.
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enjoy. 241 While notoriously difficult to quantify, this implicit subsidy
has been a crucial driver of the unprecedented consolidation and
concentration in the U.S. financial industry since the 1990s. 242 It is also
at the very core of the “too big to fail” (“TBTF”) phenomenon that came
to symbolize a recurring pattern of privatizing gains and socializing
losses of large financial institutions. 243 Taking away deposit insurance
and other forms of public subsidy currently feeding this phenomenon
would, accordingly, end the presently intractable TBTF problem.
Again, none of this means that private finance would be forced
to disappear or “shrink[ ] into irrelevance.” 244 The proposed reform
would simply redefine or restore its proper social function. In effect, it
would force private finance to conform to its own self-narrative as the
realm of pure “intermediation” between private suppliers and users of
“scarce” capital. 245 In this sense, the restructuring of the Fed’s balance
sheet, envisioned here, would allow for a more transparent, fair, and
socially beneficial delineation between the properly “private” and the
legitimately “public” spheres in modern finance.
By removing the underlying sources of banks’ present
“specialness” and fragility, the proposed change would also eliminate
the need for an intrusive and complex regime of bank regulation and
supervision. Thus, both federal deposit insurance and deposit-based
bank reserve requirements will become unnecessary. Once banks stop
depending on short-term funding of their long-term assets, mandatory
liquidity requirements, which were introduced into the Basel Capital
Accord in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, would also become
redundant. 246 Bank capital regulation would lose its present salience as
the core tool of protecting the deposit insurance fund from losses. 247 And
such controversial and complex tools of enhanced macroprudential
241. See Saule T. Omarova, The “Too Big To Fail” Problem, 103 MINN. L. REV. 2495, 2500
(2019) (noting that the “expectation that the government will always bail out [“too big to fail”]
financial institutions” is internalized by other market participants, becoming an “implicit subsidy”
of their risk-taking); The Unfulfilled Promise, supra note 231, at 1700 (“[I]n practice, it is difficult
to draw a clear line and prove that securities firms do not use access to affiliated depository
institutions to finance their speculative derivatives activities.”).
242. See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dark Side of Universal Banking: Financial
Conglomerates and the Origins of the Subprime Financial Crisis, 41 CONN. L. REV. 963, 1043–46
(2009) (showing how the process of consolidation in the financial industry led to the 2008 financial
crisis and necessitated government-sponsored rescue of large financial institutions).
243. Omarova, supra note 241, at 2495.
244. Koning, supra note 113.
245. For a discussion of the “intermediated-scarce-private-capital” orthodoxy, see Finance
Franchise, supra note 12, at 1146–47.
246. For an overview of Basel III liquidity standards, see BARR ET AL., supra note 34, at 327–
29.
247. For an overview of bank capital regulation, see id. at 291–311; CARNELL ET AL., supra
note 34, at 238–67.
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supervision as, for example, comprehensive stress testing of banks’
balance sheets, would likely be eliminated. 248
Simplifying the notoriously complex regulatory regime
governing banking institutions, however, does not mean abandoning all
regulation. As long as the sovereign public continues to subsidize any
meaningful amount of private money creation, it has to protect its
balance sheet by exercising “quality control” over its private
franchisees. 249 Familiar tools of macroprudential regulation and
supervision—including basic leverage and portfolio concentration
limits, credit underwriting standards, certain activity and affiliation
restrictions, operational risk management requirements, and so on—
would still apply to all QLIs eligible for NDW borrowing. The precise
contours of this regulatory regime will depend on, and reflect, the risk
profile of the newly reconfigured system. It is nevertheless reasonable
to expect that the overall intensity of regulatory oversight would
decrease significantly.
This shift would allow for a significant streamlining of the U.S.
bank regulatory apparatus. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(“FDIC”) would have no practical role to play. All of the continuing
prudential oversight and chartering responsibilities can then be
consolidated and transferred to the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency (“OCC”), the primary regulator of federally chartered
banks. 250 Accordingly, the scope of the Federal Reserve’s own
formal bank regulatory functions would significantly shrink, if
not disappear. 251
Importantly, the proposed change in the Fed’s relationship with
private financial firms presents a welcome opportunity for a more
effective and proactive deployment of structural regulatory levers.
Thus, the Fed could use its control over the flow of federal subsidies by
248. See 12 U.S.C. § 5365(i) (mandating annual stress tests and providing the parameters and
consequences for such).
249. See Finance Franchise, supra note 12, at 1214 (arguing that a major flaw in the current
financial system is “continuing public accommodation of private credit-generation . . . without
effective public ‘quality control’ over franchisees’ performance of their delegated responsibilities”).
250. What
We
Do,
OFF.
OF
THE
COMPTROLLER
OF
THE
CURRENCY,
https://www.occ.treas.gov/about/what-we-do/index-what-we-do.html# (last visited June 19, 2021)
[https://perma.cc/CY65-7G8M]. The OCC could charter the deposit-taking CBIs, discussed above.
See supra Part III.B (proposing that CBIs could act as the Fed’s representative offices in the field
and “help the Fed with the day-to-day administration of FedAccounts”). Because QLIs will have
direct access to the federal subsidy via the Fed’s NDW facility, it also makes sense to retain a
special chartering regime for these institutions.
251. Currently, the Fed is the primary federal regulator and supervisor of state-chartered
member banks and U.S. BHCs. See Supervision & Regulation, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED.
RSRV. SYS., https://www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg.htm (last visited June 19, 2021)
[https://perma.cc/ESP6-9G5Z] (outlining the Fed’s regulatory and supervisory activities).
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fine-tuning the NDW eligibility conditions in furtherance of its evolving
modulatory and allocative mission. In addition to familiar discount
window requirements focused on the quality of pledged collateral, the
Fed could mandate a set of other socially desirable attributes that
privately extended credit products must have in order to qualify for
NDW support. By excluding loans fueling secondary-market financial
speculation, leveraged buyouts (“LBOs”), massive stock buybacks, and
other private activities that divert resources from socially productive
enterprise, the Fed would be able to redefine the scope and nature of
QLIs’ business operations. 252
B. Potential Impact on Shadow Banking and Capital Markets
The wholesale migration of deposits to the Fed’s balance sheet
will also trigger profound changes in the size, structure, and operation
of all financial institutions and markets that currently amplify or
replicate private banks’ money-creation function outside of the
regulated banking system. 253 This includes, first and foremost, the
“shadow banking” sector. 254 It is important to remember, however, that
many key participants in shadow banking markets are regulated
financial
institutions—securities
broker-dealers,
investment
companies, swap dealers, and so forth—that also operate in the United
States and global capital markets.
1. Money Market Mutual Funds
Money Market Mutual Funds (“MMMFs”) constitute the most
obvious category of financial institutions to be affected by the proposed
creation of FedAccounts. MMMFs are open-end investment companies,
or mutual funds, that specialize in constructing diversified portfolios of
“safe” short-term debt instruments, including U.S. Treasury bills,
agency securities, and commercial paper. 255 A product of classic
252. The QLI charter would also impose entity-level limitations on permissible activities and
affiliations, similar to those currently applicable to commercial banks, to further restrict access to
the federal subsidy. Any state and local “public banks” eligible to access the NDW facility would
be subject to an appropriately modified QLI regime, to reflect their public mission. See supra notes
155, 181.
253. See supra notes 36–39 and accompanying text.
254. The term “shadow banking” was coined by Paul McCulley, formerly of PIMCO, a global
investment management firm. Paul McCulley, PIMCO, Teton Reflections, GLOB. CENT. BANK
FOCUS
2
(Sept.
5,
2007),
http://media.pimcoglobal.com/pdfs/pdf_sg/GCB%20Focus%20Sept%2007%20SGP-HK.pdf
[https://perma.cc/NU6T6485].
255. MMMFs are regulated by the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) under the
Investment
Company
Act
of
1940.
Money
Market
Fund,
INVESTOR.GOV,
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regulatory arbitrage, MMMFs were invented in the 1970s as a higherreturn alternative to interest-bearing bank deposits. 256 With certain
exceptions, special accounting rules allow MMMFs to maintain the
value of their shares at $1.00 per share. 257 Fund investors are thus
assured that they can redeem their shares on demand and without
losing any value. 258 Check-writing capabilities further enhance the
appeal of MMMF accounts as a direct substitute for regular bank
accounts. 259 In effect, MMMFs are “shadow banks” in the most direct
sense of the word. 260
Currently, the MMMF industry has well over $5 trillion in
assets. 261 MMMFs are major cash lenders in the critically important
commercial paper and repo markets. Issuing bank-like on-demand
liabilities, however, makes these funds inherently vulnerable to
massive, depositor-like investor runs. 262 This combination of factors
ultimately necessitates public accommodation and monetization of
MMMFs’ liabilities—again, in direct parallel to banks. 263
https://www.investor.gov/introduction-investing/investing-basics/glossary/money-market-fund
(last visited June 19, 2021) [https://perma.cc/Q4SY-LBA7].
256. Money Market Funds: What Are Money Market Funds?, INVESTOR.GOV,
https://www.investor.gov/introduction-investing/investing-basics/investment-products/mutualfunds-and-exchange-traded-5 (last visited June 19, 2021) [https://perma.cc/3N7S-HZUB]. At the
time, the Fed’s Regulation Q capped interest rates on deposit accounts. BARR ET AL., supra note
34, at 1302.
257. Post-2008, the SEC rules require prime institutional MMMFs to use floating “net asset
value” (“NAV”) for their shares but continue allowing retail and government MMMFs to maintain
stable NAV at $1.00 per share. 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-7(c)(1) (2021); Money Market Fund Reform;
Amendments to Form PF, 79 Fed. Reg. 47736, 47736 (Aug. 14, 2014) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R.
pts. 230, 239, 270, 274, 279).
258. If the NAV per share falls below $1.00, the fund is said to “break the buck.” In September
2008, The Reserve Primary Fund, the oldest MMMF in the United States, sent global financial
markets reeling when it “broke the buck” due to its exposure to Lehman Brothers. Diana B.
Henriques, Money Market Fund Says Customers Could Lose Money, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 16, 2008),
https://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/17/business/17fund.html?dlbk [https://perma.cc/VB5J-3U5Y].
259. BARR ET AL., supra note 34, at 1304.
260. For more on the history, operation, and legal regime governing MMMFs, see id. at 1302–
24.
261. Money Market Funds: Investment Holding Details, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RSRV.
SYS.,
https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/efa/efa-project-money-market-funds-investmentholdings-detail.htm (last updated June 21, 2021) [https://perma.cc/PR89-SFAW] (click on linked
files for data).
262. For a recent assessment of the continuing susceptibility of MMMFs to runs and the
limited success of the post-2008 reforms in addressing structural vulnerabilities in the MMMF
market, see PRESIDENT’S WORKING GRP. ON FIN. MKTS., U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, OVERVIEW
OF RECENT EVENTS AND POTENTIAL REFORM OPTIONS FOR MONEY MARKET FUNDS 3–4 (2020),
https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/136/PWG-MMF-report-final-Dec-2020.pdf
[https://perma.cc/T6GR-X9A9].
263. This public support becomes explicit and visible in times of crisis. Thus, in September
2008, the Treasury intervened to stop the run on MMMFs by guaranteeing investor balances
against losses of up to $50 billion. BARR ET AL., supra note 34, at 1315. The Fed, in turn, used its
emergency powers to set up the first Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility (“MMLF”),
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These functional parallels explain why and how the creation of
FedAccounts would disrupt the MMMF business model. Nondefaultable, interest-bearing sovereign money would render MMMFs a
lot less attractive to investors seeking liquidity and safety. Without an
ability to arbitrage between two forms of privately issued money (bank
deposit-money and MMMF “shadow” money), the original rationale for
the existence of an MMMF as a financial product would no longer exist.
Instead of functionally replicating bank deposit services, MMMFs
would likely revert to a traditional mutual fund business model and
offer straightforward investment products. In effect, MMMFs would
operate as a subset of conservative-allocation credit funds: they would
continue investing in liquid short-term public and private debt
instruments—including corporate commercial paper—and manage
their pools of assets so as to minimize risk to investors. 264 Though
relatively stable and low risk, MMMF shares will no longer be
structured or perceived as risk free.
In consequence, the size and systemic significance of the MMMF
industry would decrease substantially. This would, in turn,
significantly impact commercial paper and repo markets currently
dependent on MMMFs as principal cash lenders. MMMFs’ partial
withdrawal would contribute to the corresponding “downsizing” and derisking of these markets.
2. Commercial Paper and Repo Markets
Commercial paper is a short-term, unsecured debt instrument
issued by large, creditworthy corporations to finance their short-term
business expenses. 265 These attributes generally render it a low-risk
investment. In the lead up to the 2008 crisis, however, commercial
paper markets grew dramatically as a result of a massive rise in
financial firms’ issuances and “asset-backed commercial paper”
funding bank purchases of MMMFs’ assets. Id. In March of 2020, the Fed reinstituted its MMLF
facility as part of its response to the COVID-19 crisis. See supra note 71 and accompanying text
(noting how the Fed’s emergency response replicated some of the emergency programs created for
the 2008–2009 crisis, including the MMLF); see also BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RSRV. SYS.,
REPORT
ON
THE
FEDERAL
RESERVE’S
BALANCE
SHEET
11
(2020),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/files/balance_sheet_developments_report_202008.pd
f.pdf [https://perma.cc/HH8L-XJ9Z] (“From March 23 to 27 (the first week of operations), 568 loans
were extended to six financial institutions that purchased assets from 102 different money market
mutual funds totaling $45 billion.”).
264. MMMFs would also be able to invest in the NIA bonds as an additional “safe” asset class.
See supra Part IV.A.2 (summarizing the proposal to create the NIA).
265. To qualify for an exemption from the registration requirements of the Securities Act of
1933, commercial paper must mature in no more than 270 days and its proceeds must be used only
to pay for the issuers’ short-term expenses, such as payroll or inventory purchases. 15 U.S.C.
§ 77c(a)(3); BARR ET AL., supra note 34, at 1341.
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(“ABCP”). 266 These new forms of commercial paper carried high levels
of risk and channeled low-cost funding into speculative trading
activities in financial markets. 267 In September 2008, investor runs on
ABCP and financial-firm commercial paper effectively cut off the flow
of short-term credit to the real economy, thus significantly exacerbating
the systemic crisis. 268
In the post-2008 era, the share of commercial paper—and
especially ABCP—in the U.S. wholesale funding markets declined well
below its pre-crisis peak levels. 269 Currently, the U.S. commercial paper
volume remains at slightly over $1 trillion. 270 Most of it, however,
continues to be issued by financial firms, suggesting strong linkages to
trading activities. 271 The reform of the Fed’s balance sheet, advocated
here, offers an opportunity to strengthen this market by restoring its
original function as an efficient channel of financing the real economy—
as opposed to fueling financial speculation. Thus, smaller and more
risk-averse MMMFs would likely be already incentivized to invest
mainly in low-risk commercial paper issued by non-financial firms. The
Federal Reserve could create an additional incentive to do so by
accepting high-quality commercial paper issued by non-financial firms
as collateral for its NDW loans. 272 This would enable QLIs to increase
their holdings of commercial paper instruments tied to productive
activities in the real economy—and, indirectly, make these instruments
more attractive for MMMFs and other institutional investors.
For financial firms, the repo market would remain the key
source of short-term funding. 273 Structured as securities sales, repos are
266. See Mary Brown, Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Carries High Risk, INVESTOPEDIA,
https://www.investopedia.com/articles/bonds/08/commercial-paper.asp (last updated Mar. 20,
2021) [https://perma.cc/8WCU-RKJD] (explaining the dynamics of ABCP markets).
267. Id.; BARR ET AL., supra note 34, at 1341–43.
268. See Daniel Covitz, Nellie Liang & Gustavo A. Suarez, The Evolution of a Financial Crisis:
Collapse of the Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Market, 68 J. FIN. 815, 818–19 (2013)
(documenting the “run” on ABCP); Marcin Kacperczyk & Philipp Schnabl, When Safe Proved
Risky: Commercial Paper During the Financial Crisis of 2007–2009, 24 J. ECON. PERSP. 29, 40–41
(2010) (noting that “within one month after Lehman’s bankruptcy, commercial paper holdings fell
from 24.2 to 16.9 percent of money market funds’ assets”).
269. In large part, this is due to stricter post-crisis accounting treatment of ABCP which made
it harder for the sponsoring entities to keep these vehicles off their balance sheets. BARR ET AL.,
supra note 34, at 1343.
270. US
Money
Market
Instruments
Statistics,
SIFMA
(June
10,
2021),
https://www.sifma.org/resources/research/us-money-market-instruments-statistics/
[https://perma.cc/9ZWQ-UJBR].
271. See BARR ET AL., supra note 34, at 1341 (“Most commercial paper is financial or ABCP.”).
272. See supra Part IV.A.1 (discussing the NDW collateral eligibility requirements).
273. See Adam Copeland, Darrell Duffie, Antoine Martin & Susan McLaughlin, Key Mechanics
of the U.S. Tri-Party Repo Market, FED. RSRV. BANK OF N.Y. ECON. POL’Y REV. 3 (2012),
https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/epr/2012/1210cope.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BRW9-XSS2] (“MMFs, securities lenders, and other institutional cash
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economically equivalent to very short-term (often, overnight) loans
collateralized by securities, such as Treasury bonds. 274 In recent
decades, the U.S. repo market grew dramatically in size and systemic
significance, with the average daily amount of outstanding repo
transactions currently around $4 trillion. 275
Securities dealers are central players in repo markets. Dealers
use repos to finance their market-making and trading operations, as
well as those of their clients: hedge funds, asset managers, and other
institutional investors. 276 Repos provide dealers and fund managers
with low-cost funding for taking leveraged positions in Treasury bonds,
agency and various asset-backed securities, corporate bonds, and other
tradable instruments. 277 Thus, through a complex web of institutional
arrangements, repo markets continuously fuel the growth in the volume
and velocity of trading in secondary financial markets. 278
MMMFs are major cash lenders in repo markets; they use repo
transactions as a presumably “safe” source of increasing returns on
their cash holdings. 279 As all demand-deposit substitutes, however,
repos are inherently vulnerable to runs. 280 Thus, in 2008, a massive
“run on the repo” was one of the principal triggers of the financial
crisis. 281 Despite the post-crisis efforts to address some of the key risks

providers . . . seek interest income at short maturities [because] overnight repos serve as a secured
alternative to bank deposits. Together, MMFs and securities lenders account for over half of triparty repo lending.”).
274. See supra note 60 (defining the term “repo”).
275. See Katie Kolchin, Justyna Podziemska & Ali Mostafa, US Repo Fact Sheet, SIFMA RSCH.
6 (Jan. 2021), https://www.sifma.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/2021-US-Repo-Fact-Sheet.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6DTL-SM4D] (noting that the “[a]verage daily aggregate repo and reverse repo
outstanding” is $4.6 trillion). For data on centrally cleared repo transactions, see OFR Short-Term
Funding Monitor, OFF. OF FIN. RSCH., https://www.financialresearch.gov/short-term-fundingmonitor/ (last visited June 20, 2021) [https://perma.cc/S5A8-2HXV].
276. See Kolchin et al., supra note 275, at 5 (using a diagram to show the significant role of
securities dealers in repo markets).
277. Id. at 4.
278. For more on these dynamics, see Finance Franchise, supra note 12, at 1178–81.
279. See Jeffrey Cheng & David Wessel, What Is the Repo Market, and Why Does It Matter?
BROOKINGS (Jan. 28, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2020/01/28/what-is-the-repomarket-and-why-does-it-matter/ [https://perma.cc/FXD6-7B4G] (“[Repo markets] allow[ ] parties
with lots of spare cash (e.g. money market mutual funds) to earn a small return on that cash
without much risk, because securities, often U.S. Treasury securities, serve as collateral.”).
280. Cf. BARR ET AL., supra note 34, at 1313 (“Because MMFs have a liquidity mismatch by
transferring illiquid instruments like commercial paper to liquid MMF shares, there will always
be a possibility of a run on MMFs.”).
281. In September 2008, the failure of Lehman Brothers, a major repo borrower, caused a
massive run on repo markets, which triggered the run on MMMFs and paralyzed U.S. commercial
paper markets, as discussed above. Supra note 268 and accompanying text.
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in repo markets, they continue to experience periods of high instability,
necessitating major cash injections by the Fed. 282
The Fed’s actions highlight the repo markets’ role as direct sites
of money creation. 283 In fact, since 2008, the Federal Reserve has been
using repo operations as the key tool of managing the benchmark
federal funds rate. 284 This shift in the Fed’s monetary policy reflects the
underlying shift in the financial system’s center of gravity away from
the traditional banking and capital markets and into the inherently
volatile and privately controlled repo market. 285 Without a deeper
understanding of how this transformation alters the traditional
relationships among core financial markets and actors, however, the
Fed’s ability to conduct an effective monetary policy may be
severely compromised. 286
The creation of FedAccounts, discussed above, would give the
Fed an entirely new set of tools for achieving its monetary policy goals
in a more direct and finely tuned manner. 287 Accordingly, the Fed would
not need to engage in massive repo operations to fulfill its policy
mandate—nor would it have to provide a de facto liquidity guarantee

282. See Joe Rennison & Colby Smith, Fed Curbs Repo Volatility on Final Day of 2019, FIN.
TIMES (Dec. 31, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/4a936f9a-2bd3-11ea-a126-99756bd8f45e
[https://perma.cc/Q7SP-9RJG] (reporting multiple spikes in repo rates throughout 2018 and 2019
and stating that the FRBNY “provided $25.6bn in overnight funding on December 31[, 2019]”).
283. See Manmohan Singh, Collateral and Monetary Policy 11–12 (Int’l Monetary Fund,
Working Paper No. WP/13/186, 2013) (analyzing the role of repo collateral as a monetary
phenomenon); Manmohan Singh & Peter Stella, Money and Collateral 15 (Int’l Monetary Fund,
Working Paper No. WP/12/95, 2012) (examining the monetary effects of reusing repo collateral);
Manmohan Singh, The Velocity of Pledged Collateral: Analysis and Implications 4 (Int’l Monetary
Fund, Working Paper No. WP/11/256, 2011) (showing how nonbanks’ reuse of collateral increases
its “velocity”); Finance Franchise, supra note 12, at 1179–80.
284. See supra note 61 and accompanying text (explaining that the Fed’s repo operations keep
the key “federal funds rate” around the target established by the FOMC); see also Michael Ng &
David Wessel, The Hutchins Center Explains: How the Powell Fed Will Raise Interest Rates,
BROOKINGS (Mar. 15, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2018/03/15/the-hutchinscenter-explains-how-the-powell-fed-will-raise-interest-rates/
[https://perma.cc/TM27-UEWE]
(explaining that, after the federal funds rate hit zero in 2008 and the economy still needed more
stimulus, the Fed could no longer use open market operations to influence short-term interest
rates); Jane E. Ihrig, Ellen E. Meade & Gretchen C. Weinbach, Monetary Policy 101: A Primer on
the Fed’s Changing Approach to Policy Implementation, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RSRV. SYS.
20 (June 30, 2015), https://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/feds/2015/files/2015047pap.pdf
[https://perma.cc/KYL6-28PN] (showing how the Fed’s pre-crisis strategy based on reserve scarcity
is ineffective under today’s conditions of “superabundant” reserves in the banking system).
285. See Carolyn Sissoko, The Collateral Supply Effect on Central Bank Policy 9 (Aug. 21,
2020) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3545546
[https://perma.cc/GA4A-769R] (analyzing the increasingly critical role of the repo market in
monetary policy transmission).
286. Id.
287. See supra Part III.A (outlining the FedAccounts proposal and its various benefits).
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for repo markets. 288 The Fed’s withdrawal, in turn, would reduce the
size and systemic footprint of the repo markets. 289
Partial withdrawal of MMMFs, as a result of the fundamental
change in their own business model, would have a similar effect on repo
markets. Smaller, more conservative MMMFs would have strong
incentives to manage and price their risk exposures to repo borrowers
more carefully. Securities dealers would still be able to finance their
trading asset portfolios in repo markets, but not on the present scale
and without the benefit of the Fed’s monetization and
accommodation. 290 This would mean, in turn, less leveraged financing
for hedge funds and other entities engaged in speculative trading. In
short, the repo markets will revert to being a much smaller, specialized
segment of the financial system, rendering the system itself both less
complex and more stable.
3. Securitizations and Derivatives
Like the repo and commercial paper markets, securitizations
and derivatives markets would continue to operate but on a smaller
scale, and in a significantly less risky way, than they do today.
Securitization is a technique of pooling revenue-generating
assets, such as receivables or mortgage loans, and using the pooled
assets as collateral backing the issuance of debt instruments—“assetbacked securities” (“ABS”) or “mortgage-backed securities” (“MBS”)—to
investors. 291 Banks typically securitize their loans to free up balance
sheet capacity for further credit extensions. 292 To investors,
securitization offers a valuable ability to buy bonds “structured” to
achieve their preferred risk-return profile. 293 And borrowers generally
benefit from the increased flow and lower price of credit. 294 As the 2008
crisis has shown, however, the complexity and opacity of highly
structured, often multilayered, securitized products—especially once
they get deeply embedded in commercial paper and repo markets—are
288. See Finance Franchise, supra note 12, at 1181 (noting that the FRBNY is “currently the
largest counterparty in repo markets” and that “[p]ublic debt—U.S. Treasury and Agency
securities—still constitutes the principal underlying asset on which repo transactions occur”).
289. The Fed may continue conducting repo operations but on a smaller scale and in pursuit
of specific public policy goals.
290. On the dynamics of such accommodation and monetization, see Finance Franchise, supra
note 12, at 1181–83.
291. Id. at 1175–76.
292. Id. at 1176.
293. Ability to use ABS as collateral in repo transactions further increases their value to
institutional investors.
294. See Steven L. Schwarcz, The Alchemy of Asset Securitization, 1 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN.
133, 136–38 (1994) (explaining how securitization lowers the borrower’s cost of capital).
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a major source of risk to the stability of the financial system. 295 It is,
therefore, critical to limit securitization’s potential to create or amplify
socially undesirable speculative trading.
The reforms outlined in this Article will help to achieve this
policy goal. The NDW conditionality would be an especially potent lever
in this respect. Thus, to limit direct access to public subsidy, the Fed
could exclude all ABS from its definition of NDW-eligible collateral.
Under this regime, QLIs would still be able to obtain low-cost funding
for the underlying loans that meet the Fed’s NDW conditions—and to
securitize their riskier “non-qualifying” assets in private markets.
Without public subsidy, securitization transactions would be subject to
market discipline. ABS investors would have every incentive to conduct
due diligence on the underlying asset portfolios, thus actually
performing their presumed information-producing, valuation, and
monitoring functions. This should significantly reduce the size of
private securitization markets and lower the overall levels of nontransparent risk and complexity in them. Diminished demand for ABS
issuances as a result of parallel downsizing and de-risking in repo and
commercial paper markets, discussed above, would further contribute
to these trends.
Derivatives markets would undergo similar changes under the
proposed regime. Derivatives are contingent claim contracts that
determine counterparties’ payout and other rights and obligations by
reference to some underlying value. 296 Historically, derivatives were
used as tools of hedging risk. 297 In the years leading to the 2008 crisis,
however, bespoke derivatives markets grew dramatically in size and
capacity to generate undetected financial risks. 298 Regulatory

295. See Larry Cordell, Greg Feldberg & Danielle Sass, The Role of ABS CDOs in the Financial
Crisis, 25 J. STRUCTURED FIN. 10, 15 (2019) (noting that “of the lower-rated investment-grade
tranches of ABS CDOs, 75% were sold into or referenced as CDS in other ABS CDOs”); Larry
Cordell, Yilin Huang & Meredith Williams, Collateral Damage: Sizing and Assessing the Subprime
CDO Crisis 38 fig.1 (Fed. Rsrv. Bank of Phila., Working Paper No. 11-30/R, 2012),
https://www.philadelphiafed.org/-/media/frbp/assets/working-papers/2011/wp11-30r.pdf?la=en
[https://perma.cc/F95G-8BMD] (illustrating the process of transforming mortgage loans into
multilayered, securitized products). For a comprehensive analysis of the systemically destabilizing
rise of “private-label” securitizations, see LEVITIN & WACHTER, supra note 232, at 163–80.
296. See generally JOHN C. HULL, OPTIONS, FUTURES, AND OTHER DERIVATIVES (9th ed. 2014);
R. STAFFORD JOHNSON, INTRODUCTION TO DERIVATIVES: OPTIONS, FUTURES, AND SWAPS 1–10
(2009) (providing a brief overview of the derivatives market’s origins and operation).
297. See JOHNSON, supra note 296296, at 1 (describing the early historical uses of derivatives
by farmers seeking to manage their storage costs and pricing risk).
298. See, e.g., The Role of Derivatives in the Financial Crisis: Hearing Before the Fin. Crisis
Inquiry Comm’n, 111th Cong. (2010) (testimony of Michael Greenberger, Professor, University of
Maryland School of Law) (describing the role of the unregulated over-the-counter derivatives
market in fomenting the financial crisis of 2008).
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expansion of U.S. banks’ permissible derivatives activities 299 and the
1999 repeal of the Glass-Steagall prohibition on their ability to affiliate
with nonbank financial firms were major drivers of this growth. 300 The
subsequent wave of conglomeration and consolidation in the financial
sector has led to the emergence of global derivatives dealer-banks, able
to use their access to public subsidy to underwrite vast amounts of risky
speculative bets. 301 In the wake of the 2008 crisis, Congress sought to
preclude insured banks from dealing and trading in derivatives, but
these efforts were later substantially curtailed as a result of
industry lobbying. 302
Once banks lose their “special” status as monetary institutions,
however, the principal economic and regulatory incentives for
organizational affiliation with banks will disappear. 303 Derivatives
dealers would not be able to take on as much risk as they do under the
current system, and their diminished risk-bearing capacity would affect
both the quantity and the quality of their derivatives “books.” The fall
in their clients’ demand for risky derivatives would further decrease the
overall volume of speculative trading in derivatives and related
markets. In short, these markets would become what they ought to be:
relatively small and sophisticated private markets for prudent and
appropriately priced risk management products.
4. Securities Firms
The proposed restructuring of the Fed’s balance sheet would also
alter the structure and dynamics of broader capital markets
and securities firms operating in them as broker-dealers,
investment bankers, asset managers, derivatives dealers, and other
“intermediary” types.
By performing multiple roles in various transactional contexts,
securities firms effectively drive the functional integration of banking,
299. See Saule T. Omarova, The Quiet Metamorphosis: How Derivatives Changed the “Business
of Banking,” 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1041, 1056 (2009) (examining the process through which the
OCC granted and then gradually expanded the authority of U.S. banks to trade and deal in
derivatives).
300. See supra note 36 (discussing the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act).
301. Thus, a common practice within the FHC structure is to have securities firms enter into
derivatives trades with hedge funds and other clients and then mirror the same trades with their
affiliated banks, which end up holding the exposure on their balance sheets. This intra-group
arbitrage significantly lowers the cost of derivatives trading and dealing to the FHC. Finance
Franchise, supra note 12, at 1196–97.
302. Id. at 1197–98 (describing the “swap push-out” provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act).
303. See supra Part V.A (arguing that the loss of banks’ “special” status and privileged access
to the public subsidy will erode their current appeal as acquisition targets for other financial
institutions).
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shadow banking, and long-term capital markets. Today, securities
broker-dealers provide large amounts of margin financing for their
trading clients, such as hedge funds, enabling them to leverage their
positions across a wide variety of financial assets. 304 They also structure
and deal in complex OTC derivatives, pool and securitize multiple
layers of loans and other credit products, and act as repo lenders for
their clients. 305 Dealer-firms finance the bulk of these activities by
issuing commercial paper and borrowing cash in repo markets, often by
rehypothecating their clients’ securities. 306
In short, securities dealers continuously fuel the ever-increasing
volumes of trading in secondary financial markets—and the
accompanying growth in the system-wide levels of leverage, risk, and
interconnectedness. As emphasized throughout this discussion, the
critical factor enabling securities firms to conduct these activities on
such a massive scale is their institutional affiliation with federally
insured banks. 307 Through organizational attachment to banks,
securities dealers gain access to—and a significant degree of de facto
control over—the flow of the sovereign public’s full faith and credit
powering the financial system. 308 In an important sense, this makes
securities dealer-firms the quintessential rogue franchisees. 309
Recent attempts to reinstitute the Glass-Steagall regime of
formal separation between banking and securities firms proved
unsuccessful. 310 The reforms outlined in this Article, by contrast, would
help to achieve the same substantive result indirectly, by
fundamentally reshaping the basic dynamics of the financial market
from within. Simply taking away private banks’ monetary function will
end their currently privileged position in the financial system—and

304. “Margin trading” is the practice of borrowing money to purchase securities or other
financial assets, which are then used as collateral securing the loan extended to the trading
account holder by the broker-dealer. See Randy Frederick, Margin: How Does It Work?, CHARLES
SCHWAB (Feb. 12, 2021), https://www.schwab.com/resource-center/insights/content/margin-howdoes-it-work [https://perma.cc/SVP6-XP4P] (providing an overview of the mechanics of margin
trading).
305. Finance Franchise, supra note 12, at 1193–1201.
306. On rehypothecation dynamics, see Finance Franchise, supra note 12, at 1178–81.
307. See supra Part V.A (emphasizing the role of implicit public subsidy as the principal
impetus for the rise of diversified financial conglomerates).
308. Finance Franchise, supra note 12, at 1194–96.
309. See supra notes 36–39 and accompanying text (describing “rogue” franchisees as nonbank
financial institutions whose liabilities are directly or indirectly accommodated by the central
bank).
310. Omarova, supra note 241, at 2531–32. For a comprehensive, historically grounded
analysis of the Glass-Steagall regulatory regime and an argument for reviving it, see ARTHUR E.
WILMARTH, JR., TAMING THE MEGABANKS: WHY WE NEED A NEW GLASS-STEAGALL ACT (2020).
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remove the presently overpowering incentive for securities firms to seek
direct institutional affiliation with banks. 311
No longer being able to tap into the public subsidy would directly
affect securities dealers’ capacity both to take on highly leveraged
proprietary positions and to enable leveraged investing by their clients.
As noted earlier, margin loans would not be eligible for the NDW
funding. 312 Without a banking affiliate as the captive source of credit,
the dealer-firm would be limited in its ability to funnel large amounts
of low-cost funding into its clients’ margin accounts. The overall
tightening of the repo and commercial paper markets, discussed above,
would further constrain securities firms’ access to cheap financing.
Diminished supply and increased cost of funding would force securities
dealers to scale back their trading inventories, risk exposure, and
overall leverage. Among other things, that would lead to a significant
fall in speculative trading by hedge funds and other entities that
currently rely on leveraged financing provided by securities firms.
In addition to these institutional constraints, private actors’
ability to engage in socially harmful speculation would be curtailed as
a result of the broader structural reforms outlined above. Thus, the
Fed’s new market-making operations—OMO Plus—would effectively
preclude many opportunities for profitable short-term gambling in
financial markets. 313 The creation of the NIA, on the other hand, would
expand the menu of productive long-term investment options available
to large institutional investors, thus diverting their money away from
risky assets and directional bets. 314
In this environment, securities broker-dealers and asset
managers would cease being predominantly and necessarily scale-based
businesses, as measured by their balance sheets or assets under
management. Instead of leveraging their credit-generation capacity
and market power, these firms would go back to competing on the bases
of their superior risk assessment and management capabilities and
ability to serve their real-economy clients’ needs efficiently and nimbly.
In other words, they would revert to their original business model of
relational, skill-based investment advice, securities underwriting, and
transaction facilitation. 315 And most of their business would refocus on
311. See supra Part V.A (reasoning that, without the federal subsidy attached to demand
deposits, banks’ riskier investments and activities will be directly subject to market discipline).
312. See supra Part IV.A.1.
313. See supra Part IV.A.3 (describing the proposed OMO Plus program).
314. See supra Part IV.A.2 (outlining the NIA’s role as a credit institution and fund manager).
315. See ALAN D. MORRISON & WILLIAM J. WILHELM, JR., INVESTMENT BANKING:
INSTITUTIONS, POLITICS, AND LAW 4–7 (2007) (describing the traditional role of investment banks
as “managing an information marketplace”).
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primary markets for capital, where their intermediation services would
be more directly conducive to long-term growth of the U.S. economy.
It is difficult to foresee all of the potential implications of this
shift for the structure and operation of capital markets. It is reasonable
to expect, for instance, that many securities firms would choose to
operate as traditional partnerships. 316 At the same time, technological
changes may enable the emergence of new patterns of organizational
and functional integration in the financial industry. These
developments would require careful examination and appropriate
policy responses as they arise.
For now, the key is to show that the proposed restructuring of
the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet would fundamentally alter the
systemic dynamics of finance. Eliminating private banks’ deposittaking function and giving the Fed new asset-side tools of shaping
economy-wide credit flows, as discussed above, will dramatically reduce
the levels of speculative activity in secondary markets for financial
instruments. It will, accordingly, render financial markets less risky,
less complex, and more manageable sites of private “intermediation,” as
opposed to unauthorized credit-generation. The precise size and
composition of these markets will depend on the supply of, and actual
demand for, private financing of productive economic enterprise. It will
stop being a function of nonbanks’ ability to tap into the full faith and
credit of the United States. In that sense, the People’s Ledger will
simply restore the traditionally central role of private ordering and risktaking in private finance. It will return the markets to their original
state of “freedom.”
CONCLUSION
This Article offers a blueprint for reshaping the basic
architecture and dynamics of modern finance. Using the creation of
digital-dollar FedAccounts as its starting point, the Article constructs a
coherent set of structural reforms aiming to make the financial system
more inclusive, efficient, and stable. It contemplates a comprehensive
update of the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet—the nation’s core
economic ledger—to maximize its structural capacity to support
productive economic enterprise, in the long-term interests of the
American people. In effect, it reimagines the role of a central bank as
the ultimate public platform for generating, modulating, and allocating
financial resources in a modern economy—the People’s Ledger.

316. Id. at 15–16.
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The vision presented in this Article is inherently modular: most
individual reforms outlined here can be implemented on a standalone
basis. Thus, technically speaking, CBDC issuance is neither necessary
for nor fundamentally dependent on the creation of the NIA or the OMO
Plus facility. Each of these ideas has its own policy rationale and
potential to generate substantial public benefits. Nevertheless, as the
Article shows, an integrated approach to democratizing finance would
enable us to unlock tremendous synergies among these proposals and
magnify their beneficial effects.
The People’s Ledger framework embodies precisely this type of
a cohesive reform agenda. Putting it in action would profoundly change
the organization and essential dynamics of the financial system.
Needless to say, many details of this multifaceted systemic redesign
require further thinking and analysis. The proposal will undoubtedly
invite numerous questions and criticisms this Article does not claim to
answer or preempt. As stated from the outset, the Article is meant to
be a synthesizing, boundary-defining exercise. Its goal is not to
repackage or refine familiar prescriptions but to expand the scope—and
to sharpen the focus—of the currently fragmented public debate on
what “democratizing finance” means in today’s complex world.
Doing so is especially urgent in light of the ongoing digitization
of finance, which includes rapid proliferation of privately issued digital
money and privately run digital payments systems. Notwithstanding
their rhetoric of democratization, these technologies threaten to
undermine the fundamental balance of the sovereign public’s and
private actors’ relative powers and roles in the financial system. 317 As
decades-old institutional arrangements come under increasing
pressure, what replaces them becomes a matter of utmost public policy
importance. This Article offers a unified set of structural solutions to
this all-important structural challenge.

317. See generally Saule T. Omarova, New Tech v. New Deal: Fintech as a Systemic
Phenomenon, 36 YALE J. ON REGUL. 735 (2019) (arguing that new technology threatens to increase
private financial institutions’ ability to over-generate risk and leverage in the financial system,
without the corresponding increase in the public’s ability to control that process); Saule T.
Omarova, Technology v Technocracy: Fintech as a Regulatory Challenge, 6 J. FIN. REGUL. 75, 76
(2020) (“While new technologies can make financial services more efficient and widely accessible,
they can also amplify the system’s currently dysfunctional dynamics of excessive generation and
speculative misallocation of credit and money.”).

